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POLITICS AND AUTHORITY IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
Joshua B. Fischmarit
Public discourse on the Supreme Court often focuses on
the divide between the liberal and conservative Justices.
There has been a second persistent divide in the Court, how-
ever, which has been largely overlooked by scholars, the me-
dia, and the public. This second divide has arisen most often
in cases involving the jury trial right, the Confrontation Clause,
the Fourth Amendment, punitive damages, and the interpreta-
tion of criminal statutes. This Article argues that this divide
represents disagreements among the Justices over how to de-
termine the limits of the authority of legal actors, particularly
juries, executive offtcials, and trialjudges. On one side of this
divide are "authority formalists," who interpret power-allocat-
ing laws literally and seek clear boundaries of authority. On
the other side are "authority functionalists," who interpret
such provisions in a more flexible and purposive manner. Us-
ing classical multidimensional scaling, this Article demon-
strates that this divide can be derived naturally from the
disagreement rates among the Justices and has been robust
and significant over the last two decades. Although political
values strongly influence the Court's decisions, legal princi-
ples play a larger role than many observers acknowledge.
However, the two-dimensional issue space also creates the
potential for many social choice pathologies to arise in the
Court's collective decision making.
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Media coverage of the Supreme Court invariably empha-
sizes the political implications of its decisions and the ideologi-
cal divisions among the Justices.' Political science research on
the Court similarly views the Court as a thoroughly political
body.2 Even some legal scholars, who have historically been
1 See, e.g., Jonah J. Horwitz, Writing a Wrong: Improving the Relationship
Between the Supreme Court and the Press, 40 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 511, 522 (2014)
(describing "the pains journalists take to emphasize the politics of the Court");
Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMEs (May 10, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/upshot/the-polarized-court.html [https://
perma.cc/3BFT-XEFB] (discussing the Court's frequent division along partisan
lines).
2 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002) (describing the attitudinal model,
which holds that "the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the
case vis-d-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices"); Lee Epstein &
Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 19.1, 19.1
(2013) ("Among political scientists, not only is it uncontroversial to say that judges
[Vol. 104:15131514
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skeptical of such claims, describe the Court as "political" or
even "partisan."3 Defensive Supreme Court Justices have oc-
casionally felt the need to deny that they are merely "junior
varsity politicians."4
Amidst this persistent focus on the Justices' ideological
divisions, legal commentators have largely overlooked a second
persistent divide within the Court over the last two decades.
This Article argues that this second divide represents disagree-
ments among the Justices about the allocation of authority
within the legal system. In the most prominent examples of
this divide, the Court splintered across traditional ideological
lines in a series of cases, including Apprendi v. New Jersey,5
that involved the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines.
Media coverage6 and academic commentary7 on these cases
seek to etch their political values into law; it would be near heresy to suggest
otherwise.").
3 See, e.g., MARK TJSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAw AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS
COuRT xvi-xvii (2013) (arguing that Supreme Court justices have "differing consti-
tutional visions ... systematically associated with the two parties"); Neal Devins &
Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court
into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REv. 301, 301 (2017) (characterizing the
current Supreme Court as "partisan"); Richard A. Posner, Foreword- A Political
Court, 119 HARv. L. REv. 31, 34 (2005) (contending that the Supreme Court acts as
a political body in constitutional cases).
4 See Jamie Ehrlich, Kagan: Confirmation Gridlock Makes Supreme Court
Look Like 'Junior Varsity Politicians', CNN (July 25, 2018), https://www.
enn.com/2018/07/25/politics/kagan-kavanaugh-junior-varsity-politicians/in
dex.html [https://perma.cc/RK4C-FNHC]; Jessica Gresko, Breyer: Court Isn't '9
Junior Varsity Politicians', Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 13, 2010), http://
archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/09 [https://
perma.ce/8XA-69WX].
5 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6 See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Trial by Jury; New Jersey Hate
Crime Law Struck Down, N.Y. TIMEs (June 27, 2000), https://www.nytirnes.com/
2000/06/27/us/the-supreme-court-trial-by-jury-new-jersey-hate-crime-law-
struck-down.html [https://perma.cc/CY83-TK581 (noting that Apprendi "cut
across the court's usual ideological lines"); Charles Lane, Sentencing Standards
No Longer Mandatory, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2005), https://www.washing
tonpost. com/archive/politics/2005/0 1/13/sentencing-standards-no-longer-
mandatory/cefO9fb3-7b95-48b2-9b8d-b 142f3896540/?noredirect=0N&utm_
term=.6b8985ed5640 [https://perma.cc/RK4C-FNHC] (noting the persistent "lib-
eral-conservative alliance" in the jury trial cases).
7 See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehn-
quist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1043 (2006) (describing these sentencing
decisions as "the product of an alliance between Justices that the attitudinalists
view as the extreme left and right of the Court"); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and
Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely
Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 194 (2005) (observing that the
"more liberal Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined more conservative
Justices Scalia and Thomas" in three prominent cases involving the jury trial
right); Jeffrey L. Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Proce-
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noted the unusual majority coalition-consisting of Justices
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, John Paul
Stevens, Clarence Thomas-but treated it as an idiosyncratic
coalition of conservative originalists and liberal Justices sym-
pathetic toward criminal defendants.8 Scholars have also
noted unusual alignments in cases involving punitive dam-
ages,9 search and seizure,10 the rule of lenity," and statutory
interpretation,12 but these coalitions were often viewed as simi-
larly idiosyncratic. Commentators have overlooked that many
of these allegedly idiosyncratic alignments are remarkably sim-
ilar to the divide in ApprendL For example, the five-Justice
majority in Apprendi reappeared in cases involving the Con-
frontation Clause, ' 3 the Fourth Amendment, 14 the federal
dure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1506-10 (2006) (discussing the divisions within the
Court in Sixth Amendment cases); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 n.33 (2012) (characterizing the divisions within the
Court as largely ideological, but acknowledging that "the Justices have split along
a different dimension regarding two important but low-salience Sixth Amendment
issues: the scope of the Confrontation Clause . . . and the scope of a judge's
sentencing authority"); Richard E. Myers II, Restoring the Peers in the "Bulwark":
Blakely v. Washington and the Court's Jury Project, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1383, 1390
(2005) ("The odd lineup of votes in the Blakely line of cases ... suggests that there
is something more at play than the political scientists' models can explain.").
8 See Barkow, supra note 7, at 1046 (describing the Apprendi majority as "a
partnership between the Court's self-proclaimed originalists ... and those mem-
bers of the Court who are most sensitive to the role of the judiciary in protecting
criminal defendants' rights from majority politics"); Bibas, supra note 7, at 194
("The originalist and formalist reading of the Sixth Amendment dovetailed well
enough with solicitude for criminal defendants' due process rights to forge this
unusual coalition."); Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REv. 144, 161
(2016) (describing the Apprendi majority as constituting a "deal between the
Court's liberals and its formalists").
9 See Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of
Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REv. 525, 526 (2011) (attributing the "Su-
preme Court's incursion into punitive damages jurisprudence" to "an unusual
coalition of liberal and conservative Justices in the various closely divided deci-
sions"); Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric ofJudicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
555, 575 n. 111 (2010) ("Cases that concern limits on punitive damages ... also
implicate splits that are difficult to describe in ideological terms.").
10 See Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the
Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 187 & 187 n.176 (2013) (describing a
"nascent alliance among Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, [Sonia] Sotomayor, and
[Elena] Kagan" in Fourth Amendment cases).
11 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 709 (5th ed. 2014) (ob-
serving "odd lineups" in cases involving the rule of lenity because it "appeals to
both civil libertarians . .. and high formalists").
12 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Immunity Below State Level, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A15 ("The unusual alignment of votes in this case was a
reminder that the justices' ideological alliances do not reliably predict outcomes,
especially in cases of statutory interpretation.").
13 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009).
14 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 333 (2009).
1516
POLITICS AND AUTHORITY
money-laundering statute,15 and the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act16 (FEIA).17 With the defection of Justice Souter, the
remaining Justices in the Apprendi majority formed the dissent
in cases involving punitive damages18 and the Armed Career
Criminal Act' 9 (ACCA). 2 0
While commentators invariably notice when the Court di-
vides between liberal and conservative Justices, this second
divide has remained largely invisible. For example, in a recent
commentary on the FELA case, Norfolk & Western Railway v.
Ayers,2 1 Richard Lazarus noted the "unusual breakdown of the
Justices"22 and quipped that the common thread linking the
dissenters was that they were alumni of Stanford University.2 3
Yet Lazarus overlooked that the coalitions in Ayers were identi-
cal to the coalitions in ApprendL Had the Justices divided
along liberal-conservative lines, it would have been impossible
to miss.
Analyzing the votes of the Justices from the 1994-2015
Terms, this Article argues that the Justices have regularly di-
vided along two separate orthogonal axes. The first axis repre-
sents the familiar "political" divide between liberals and
conservatives. The second axis, which arose in Apprendi and
related cases, is best understood as representing divisions
about the boundaries of legal authority. Cases implicating the
"authority divide" typically address questions about "who de-
cides": which legal actors have authority to make which deter-
minations under which circumstances. This divide arises
when the Justices interpret laws that allocate decision-making
authority among legal institutions, most notably juries, execu-
tive officials, and trial judges. This divide is especially salient
in contexts where properly delegated authority is uncon-
strained or subject to limited review.
On one side of the authority spectrum are the authority
formalists, a coalition that includes, at different points in time,
Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and
15 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 509 (2008). Justice Stevens
concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
16 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
17 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 139 (2003).
18 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007).
19 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
20 See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007).
21 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
22 Richard J. Lazarus, Norfolk & Western Railway v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135




Thomas. These Justices are more inclined to follow literal in-
terpretations of legal sources that allocate institutional author-
ity. They are reluctant to interpret such sources in a purposive
manner, perhaps out of concern that such a reading would
encroach on the authority of the actors that exercise delegated
authority. When laws delegating power have ambiguities, they
are more willing to craft hard rules to ensure clear boundaries
of authority.
On the other side are authority functionalists, consisting of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, and Anthony Ken-
nedy, with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sotomayor
serving as swing voters. The authority functionalists are more
receptive to purposive interpretations of authority-allocating
laws. They are more inclined to presume the existence of a
social consensus regarding the ends served by these laws and
have greater confidence in the capacity of judges to identify
these ends. They are willing to interpret authority-allocating
texts flexibly when literal interpretations would undermine
these social goals.
Using classical multidimensional scaling (MDS) to analyze
the Justices' votes from the 1994-2015 Terms, this Article
demonstrates that these divisions have been persistent
throughout the last two decades.2 4 The analysis relies purely
on the Justices' rates of disagreement in voting coalitions,
without any subjective assessment of the issues implicated in
cases or the ideological directions of the votes. On the basis of
these disagreement rates, the Apprendi coalition arises natu-
rally as the second divide within the Supreme Court. The anal-
ysis reveals a two-dimensional voting structure that is robust,
stable, and statistically significant, contrary to the view of
many political scientists that the Justices occupy a one-dimen-
sional ideological spectrum.2 5 While the first dimension ex-
24 The publication timeline for this Article did not allow analysis of the most
recent terms that included Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. A prelim-
inary analysis of the 2018 Term suggests that the Court's voting structure is still
two dimensional, with Justice Kavanaugh siding with the authority functionalists
and Justice Gorsuch with the authority formalists. However, it would be prema-
ture to draw strong conclusions at this time.
25 See Bernard Grofnan & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice
on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of "Natural
Courts" 1953-1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 57-58 (2002) (concluding that the Su-
preme Court was largely unidimensional between 1953 and 1991); Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145 (2002)
(estimating ideal points for Supreme Court Justices in a unidimensional policy
1518 [Vol. 104:1513
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plains most of the disagreement between the liberal and
conservative blocs, the second dimension explains more of the
disagreement among the Justices within each of these blocs.
From a normative perspective, the finding that the Court is
two-dimensional has both positive and negative implications.
On the positive side, the analysis of the authority dimension
demonstrates that the Justices are motivated by legal princi-
ples even in some notably divisive cases. Although this does
not necessarily undermine the perception of the Court as
highly political,26 it does refute some of the more reductionist
portrayals of the Justices as "politicians in black robes."2 7
On the negative side, however, social choice theory shows
that many pathologies arise in collective decision making when
voters are operating in a multidimensional issue space. In
cases implicating both dimensions, there is a potential for vote
cycling, the doctrinal paradox, and splintered plurality deci-
sions where no majority derives from a common rationale.28
These effects may undermine the coherence of precedent over
time.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
background on spatial voting models and explains the concept
of the dimensionality of a voting body. It then turns to a dis-
cussion of scaling methods used to estimate judicial prefer-
ences. Part II reports the results of the scaling analysis as
applied to the U.S. Supreme Court for the 1994-2015 Terms.
Part III describes the political values at issue in many first-
dimension cases and the debates about authority that arise in
many second-dimension cases. It contrasts the authority the-
ory of the second dimension with prior theories based on rules
and standards, and it explains the conflicting perspectives of
the authority formalists and functionalists. To support this
theory of the second dimension, Part IV provides a detailed
discussion of cases that divide along the authority dimension
space); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on
the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1275, 1281 n.26 (2005) (claiming
that "[n]early all statistical work on the United States Supreme Court suggests
that the issue space is single-dimensional"); Keith T. Poole, The Unidimensional
Supreme Court, https://legacy.voteview.com/the-unidimensional-supreme
court.htm [https://perma.cc/ZFQ5-78PN] (last visited July 10, 2017) (character-
izing the Supreme Court as "basically unidimensional").
26 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
27 HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE 259 (2d ed. 1988).
28 Vote cycling occurs when there are more than two choices, and no choice
dominates the others by majority vote. The doctrinal paradox arises when the
rationales supported by different majority coalitions within the Court are incon-
sistent with the Court's judgment. See infra Part V.
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and explains the principles that tie them together. Part V dis-
cusses some important implications of the findings in this Arti-
cle. Drawing upon social choice theory, it discusses several
important complexities that arise in group decision making
when the Court is two-dimensional. The Appendix provides
details of the statistical analysis and a full list of cases that
most directly implicate the authority divide.
I
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK: IDENTIFYING THE DIMENSIONS
OF A COURT
A. The Dimensionality of a Voting Body
Many political scientists have claimed that Supreme Court
Justices vote largely on the basis of one-dimensional policy
preferences.29 The primary disagreement among these schol-
ars concerns whether the Justices are constrained or uncon-
strained in their pursuit of policy preferences. Proponents of
the "attitudinal model" view the Justices as largely uncon-
strained.3 0 According to proponents of the "strategic model,"
however, the Court is constrained by Congress, the executive
branch, and public opinion, so that Justices are not always
able to vote their policy preferences.3 1
Scholars from both camps, however, often repeat the claim
that the Justices' underlying policy preferences can be charac-
terized by a one-dimensional spectrum.3 2 This view is espe-
cially important in positive political theory, which largely relies
on one-dimensional models of judicial behavior for the sake of
tractability.33 These scholars rarely question the notion of a
unidimensional court, and indeed, it is not always clear what
this claim even means. As an empirical matter, there is no
universally accepted method for determining if a voting space is
unidimensional.3 4
29 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 92-97.
31 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12-17 (1997);
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 112.
32 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33 See Joshua B. Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evi-
dence from Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD.
S269, S287 (2015).
34 See Joshua B. Fischman and David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and
How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133, 151 (2009) (observing
that "there is no generally accepted methodology for assessing the dimensionality




The concept of the dimensionality of a voting space is
rooted in the theory of spatial voting models.3 5 Figure 1 repro-
duces a canonical representation of a one-dimensional policy
space provided by Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in their
discussion of the attitudinal model.3 6 The policy space in this
example models Fourth Amendment cases based on the degree
of intrusiveness of the search under review. Searches on the
left end of the spectrum are the least intrusive; searches on the
right are the most intrusive. Three judges are depicted in Fig-
ure 1, labeled as Judges A, B, and C. Their locations in the
voting space represent indifference points, representing the
point at which each judge would be indifferent between up-
holding and striking a search. Each judge would vote to up-
hold all searches to the left of her indifference point but
invalidate all searches to the right of her indifference point. In
this depiction, Judge A is the most liberal judge, in the sense of
being the most willing to hold that searches violate the Fourth
Amendment. Judge C is the most conservative in this regard,
and Judge B is the moderate.
FIGURE 1: ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
CASES
Least Less More Most
Intrusive Intrusive Intrusive Intrusive
Judge A Judge B Judge C
Suppose that a case falls on the spectrum between Judges
A and B, in the region labeled "Less Intrusive." According to
this model, Judges B and C would vote to uphold the search
while Judge A would vote to invalidate it. Similarly, Judges A
and B would agree to invalidate a search in the region labeled
"More Intrusive," while Judge C would uphold it. In cases to
the left of Judge A-the least intrusive searches-all three
judges would uphold the search. All three would strike the
most intrusive searches in cases to the right of Judge C.
If these judges formed a three-Judge court, the one-dimen-
sional model would predict three kinds of coalitions. First,
cases at the extreme ends of the spectrum would be unani-
mous. Second, Judges B and C could form a majority against
35 See generaly JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF
VOTING: AN INTRODUCTION (1984) (providing an introduction to the spatial theory of
voting).
36 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 90 fig.3. 1.
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Judge A, as in the first example. Third, Judges A and B could
form a majority against Judge C, as in the second example. If
the one-dimensional model is strictly correct, there should
never be cases in which Judges A and C form a majority and
Judge B dissents.
This implication of the one-dimensional model can be ex-
pressed in terms of the disagreement rates among the Justices.
Let de represent the rate of disagreement between Judges A
and B, and similarly for the other pairs of judges. If Judges A
and C never form a coalition against Judge B, then the follow-
ing equation must hold:
dAc= dAB + dc (1)
Equation (1) is depicted visually in Figure 1: de represents
the number of cases in the region labeled "Less Intrusive" while
dBc represents the number of cases in the region labeled "More
Intrusive." Thus, this comparison of disagreement rates can
serve as a test for strict unidimensionality. If a court is one-
dimensional, this equality must hold for any three judges, with
the moderate judge in any trio taking the place of Judge B in
the example.
In most settings, this strong version of unidimensionality
will be violated. There will typically be some cases in which
Judges A and Cjoin together against Judge B. Such deviations
from unidimensionality could be idiosyncratic or systematic.
Idiosyncratic deviations are inexplicable, seemingly random
events, such as if the judges occasionally changed their votes
depending on what they ate for breakfast. Systematic devia-
tions follow some recognizable pattern. If majorities consisting
of Judges A and C occurred in cases involving a particular
statute or legal issue, these would be systematic deviations
from unidimensionality.
FIGURE 2: ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL WITH FIVE JUDGES
Least Most
Intrusive Intrusive
Judge A Judge B Judge C Judge D Judge E
A second form of systematic deviation from unidimension-
ality is most easily seen in courts where there are more than
three judges. Consider a court with five judges depicted in
Figure 2. In this model, all nonunanimous decisions would
consist of more liberal judges against more conservative ones,
1522 [Vol. 104:1513
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such as Judges A and B against Judges C, D, and E. Suppose
that most decisions in fact conform to this one-dimensional
model. However, occasionally Judges B, C, and E form a ma-
jority against Judges A and D. Judge A never forms a dissent-
ing coalition with any other conservative judge, and Judge D
never dissents with any other liberal. This occasional coalition
of Judges A and D could not be explained as random behavior,
because their deviations from the unidimensional model are
synchronous. It would be impossible to know why this coali-
tion recurs without examining the cases in which it appears.
Nevertheless, this synchronous voting behavior of Judges A
and D would be sufficient to reject the notion that these devia-
tions are random. These coalitions could be better explained
by an additional dimension that aligns judges A and D together
against judges B, C, and E.
The distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic devi-
ations are key to understanding the dimensionality of a voting
space. It is well known that the Justices do not conform per-
fectly to a one-dimensional voting model. To take a simple
example, consider three Justices who could be ordered from
liberal to conservative: Justices Sotomayor, Kennedy, and Al-
ito. During the 2009-15 Terms, Justice Kennedy disagreed
with Justice Sotomayor in 31% of cases and with Justice Alito
in 27% of cases.3 7 Using the same notation as above for disa-
greement rates, dSotomayorKennedy + dKermedyAlito= 58%. Yet Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Alito disagreed 49% of the time, less
than the sum of their disagreement rates with Justice Ken-
nedy. In roughly 9% of the cases, Justices Sotomayor and Alito
formed a coalition against Justice Kennedy. In fact, Equation
(1) fails for every triple of Justices who have served since 1994.
Thus, when observers describe the Court as one-dimen-
sional, they are typically claiming that a one-dimensional
model provides a good approximation of the Justices' voting
behavior. For example, a single dimension might explain a
sufficiently large proportion of the Justices' votes.3 8 Others,
37 The Supreme Court Database, Justice Centered Data, 2016 Release 01,
WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php?s=2 [https://perma.
cc/9HBK-UR4Y] (last visited July 13, 2017).
38 See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 25, at 58 (choosing a one-dimensional
representation of the Supreme Court because it accounts for a large proportion of
the variance in the voting data); Martin & Quinn, supra note 25, at 145 (defending
a unidimensional model because "approximately 93% of all cases fall on a single
dimension"); Poole, supra note 25 (claiming that the Court is one-dimensional
based on a number of fit measures, including the size of the first eigenvalue in the
matrix decomposition, the stress from one-dimensional nonmetric scaling, and
the percentage of votes correctly classified in the Optimal Scaling algorithm).
2019]1 1523
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however, have questioned the conclusion that the Court is one-
dimensional on the basis of different criteria.3 9
This Article uses a concept of dimensionality based on sta-
tistical significance, considering whether deviations from per-
fect spatial voting are idiosyncratic rather than systematic.40
The second dimension does not explain as many votes as the
first, but it is statistically significant, robust over time, and
recurs in particular areas of case law. Most importantly, it
represents meaningful disagreements among the Justices
about the allocation of authority to legal actors.
B. Estimating the Dimensions of the Supreme Court
Research in political science often uses spatial models to
derive ideology scores for legislators from their voting behavior.
In such models, the legislators have preferences in an issue
space and each legislator has an ideal policy. 4 ' For any bill,
each legislator will vote 'yea' or 'nay' depending on whether the
bill would be closer to the legislator's ideal policy than the
status quo. By analyzing the legislators' votes on various roll
calls, researchers can derive estimates of each legislator's ideal
point in the policy space. Such estimates can then be used to
predict the legislators' future behavior and to test hypotheses
about their voting behavior. As a general matter, these models
do not require the researcher to specify whether a particular
vote is liberal or conservative. The dimensions of the policy
39 See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides into
the Sunset, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 310-19 (2007) (using three indices based on
the coalitions that a Justice joins, a "Sophisticated Index," "NaIve Index," and
"Modified Median Index," to justify the conclusion that the Court is multidimen-
sional); Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Su-
preme Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1671, 1689-98 (2016) (claiming that the
Court is two-dimensional on the basis of similarity of scaling diagrams across two
distinct time periods); Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme
Court's Many Median Justices, 106 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 847, 863-64 (2012) (con-
cluding that the Court is multidimensional on the basis of unidimensional order-
ings of the Justices that vary across issue areas); Michael Peress, Small Chamber
Ideal Point Estimation, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 276, 286-88 (2009) (estimating the fit of
multidimensional models of the Supreme Court using log-likelihood, percent of
votes correctly predicted, geometric mean probability, and Bayesian information
criterion and concluding that the Court has between two and four dimensions);
Lawrence Sirovich, A Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme
Court, 100 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7432, 7436 (2003) (concluding that the Court is
multidimensional on the basis of the Shannon entropy of vectors of Justices'
votes).
40 See James J. Heckman & James M. Snyder, Jr., Linear Probability Models
of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Prefer-
ences of Legislators, 28 RAND J. ECON. S142, S169-S174 (1997) (rejecting good-
ness-of-fit measures of dimensionality in favor of statistical methods).
41 See KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING 1 (2005).
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space are interpreted after the analysis on the basis of the bills
and votes cast.
Although there are important differences between courts
and legislatures, political scientists often use these ideal point
models in an identical manner to estimate judges' ideal
points.42 On a multimember appellate court, each judge can
vote in favor of the appellant or the respondent, depending on
which holding would be closer to the judge's ideal point. An
ideal point model can then estimate the judges' ideal points
from the voting coalitions in a set of cases.
These methods typically posit a policy space in a prespeci-
fied number of dimensions. However, there are no universally
accepted methods or criteria for estimating the number of
dimensions.4 3 Indeed, there are numerous methods for esti-
mating ideal points,44 which can estimate sharply different
numbers of dimensions from the same roll call votes.4 5
The analysis in this Article uses classical multidimensional
scaling (MDS) to scale the Justices in multiple dimensions.
First developed in the 1950s,4 6 classical MDS is one of the
oldest scaling methods used to generate mappings of groups of
objects. MDS uses a matrix of disagreement rates among the
Justices to generate a mapping of the Justices in any number
of dimensions. Classical MDS is a simple form of ideal point
model4 7 that is computationally simple to estimate and relies
42 See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and
Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433,
438-46 (2007) (applying an ideal point model to estimate the ideology of Supreme
Court justices in a common space with presidents and members of Congress);
Martin & Quinn, supra note 25, at 137-45 (developing a model that estimates
dynamic ideal points for Supreme Court justices).
43 See POOLE, supra note 41, at 141 (stating that there is no clear way to
decide how many dimensions to estimate).
44 See id. at 46-49, 88-89 (describing a variety of parametric and
nonparametric ideal point models); Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman & Douglas
Rivers, The StatisticalAnalysls ofRoll Call Data, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 355, 356-66
(2004) (comparing three models for estimating ideal points).
45 See Fischman & Law, supra note 34, at 151 & n.47 (observing that one
scaling method generated two dimensions for Congress, while another yielded at
least six); Timothy J. Brazill & Bernard Grofman, Factor Analysis Versus Multi-
Dimensional Scaling: Binary Choice Roll-Call Voting and the U.S. Supreme Court,
24 SOCIAL NETwORKs 201, 222-23 (2002) (demonstrating that factor analysis esti-
mates more dimensions than multidimensional scaling in both simulated and
actual data sets).
46 See W.S. Torgerson, Multidimensional Scaling: I. Theory and Method, 17
PSYCHOMETRIKA 401, 416-19 (1952).
47 See Persi Diaconis, Sharad Goel & Susan Holmes, Horseshoes in Mul-
tidimensional Scaling and Local Kernel Methods, 2 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 777,
783-84 (2008) (showing how multidimensional scaling is consistent with the as-
sumptions of ideal point models).
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on minimal assumptions. For this reason, it is often used as a
preliminary approach before applying more sophisticated ideal
point models.4 3
MDS can be applied to any group of objects that has a
matrix of dissimilarity measures for every pair of objects. MDS
generates a map that represents the objects in a multidimen-
sional space, where the distance between each pair of objects is
meant to correspond to the degree of dissimilarity between the
objects.4 9 The goal is not to match the dissimilarities precisely,
but rather to generate a mapping that provides insight into the
structure of the objects.
To take a simple example, if the objects are cities and the
dissimilarities are physical distances, then multidimensional
scaling can generate a map of those cities.5 0 If the objects are
justices of the Supreme Court, MDS can generate a map in
which their pairwise distances approximately correspond to
their disagreement rates. In other applications, the mapping
may be more abstract. MDS is often used in psychology to
generate mappings of people's subjective perceptions, such as
similarities among colors or facial expressions.5 1 In marketing
research, MDS is used to generate mappings of product mar-
kets, such as for yogurt or breakfast cereals.5 2 In these appli-
cations, the mappings would be based on customers' perceived
similarities among various brands.
Many recent studies in judicial politics favor ideal point
models for analyzing roll call data.5 3 However, MDS has sev-
eral advantages for assessing the dimensionality of a voting
body such as the Supreme Court. First, because it only relies
on disagreement rates, it provides a direct and intuitive test of
dimensionality. If the Justices fit within a single dimension,
their disagreement rates will satisfy Equation (1) for every
48 See POOLE, supra note 41, at 7-11.
49 See INGWER BORG & PATRICK J.F. GROENEN, MODERN MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCAL-
ING: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 3 (2d ed. 2005).
50 See id. at 19-23.
51 See id. at 63-68, 73-76.
52 See TREVOR F. COX & MICHAEL A.A. COX, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 71-73 (2d
ed. 2001) (mapping brands of breakfast cereals); L.M. Poste & C.F. Patterson,
Multidimensional Scaling - Sensory Analysis of Yoghurt, 21 CAN. INST. FOOD SCI. &
TECH. J. 271, 273-77 (1988) (mapping varieties of yogurt).
53 See, e.g., Clinton et al., supra note 44 (advocating the use of Bayesian ideal
point estimation for analyzing roll call data); Bailey, supra note 42, at 440-46
(using Bayesian ideal point model to estimate ideal points for presidents, mem-
bers of Congress, and Supreme Court Justices in a common space); Martin &




triple, and the scaling algorithm will generate a mapping in
which the judges fall along a straight line.
Second, MDS is consistent with prior studies that have
mapped the Justices in multiple dimensions.4 The most influ-
ential of these was a study by Bernard Grofman and Timothy
Brazill, which claimed that the Court is one-dimensional.5 5
Grofman and Brazill used a form of MDS to analyze the Su-
preme Court from 1953 until 1991 and found that a single
dimension explained a large proportion of the variance in the
Justices' votes.5 6
Third, classical MDS in particular is ideally suited to esti-
mating the dimensions of a voting space because it does not
require specifying the number of dimensions of the voting
space prior to the estimation.5 7 By contrast, ideal point models
and more modern forms of MDS require the analyst to specify
the number of dimensions beforehand; in other words, one
must guess the number of dimensions in order to estimate the
number of dimensions. It is possible to hypothesize a number
of dimensions that is clearly excessive and then determine how
many of the estimated dimensions are meaningful. Even then,
however, the conclusions may vary depending on how many
dimensions are initially assumed.
Because the MDS analysis of the Court relies only on disa-
greement rates among the Justices, it does not require any
categorization of the cases or coding of the outcomes. This
means, however, that the axes of the MDS map have no intrin-
sic meaning. It is the task of the analyst to generate interpreta-
tions of these axes after the mapping is generated. This can be
achieved in several ways. The analyst may compare the coordi-
nates of the objects with their characteristics, to determine
which of these characteristics correspond to each dimension.
For example, an article that generated an MDS mapping of
yogurt brands found that the first dimension corresponded to
54 See Fischman, supra note 33, at S282-87 (using MDS to compare the
positions taken by Supreme Court Justices and interest groups); Fischman &
Jacobi, supra note 39, at 1689-98 (using MDS to analyze seven terms of the
Roberts Court); Noah Giansiracusa & Cameron Ricciardi, Computational Geome-
try and the U.S. Supreme Court, 98 MATH. Soc. Sci. 1, 2-5 (2019) (applying MDS to
the Supreme Court Justices to illustrate three voting models); Peter A. Hook, The
Aggregate Harmony Metric and a Statistical and Visual Contextuallzation of the
Rehnquist Court: 50 Years ofData, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 254-55 (2007) (using
MDS to analyze the last decade of the Rehnquist Court).
5s See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 25, at 58.
56 See id. at 57-58.
57 See BORG & GROENEN, supra note 49, at 263.
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texture characteristics while the second dimension captured
sweetness and acidity.58
When MDS or ideal point models are applied to Congres-
sional roll calls or judicial coalitions, the dimensions can be
interpreted by reference to votes that divide most directly along
each dimension. For example, one analysis of Senate roll calls
found a second ideological dimension occurring in bills involv-
ing race and civil rights59 while another found a second dimen-
sion involving trade and international agreements.60 A third
examination of Congressional roll calls found multiple dimen-
sions arising in bills involving subjects such as civil liberties,
appropriations, and foreign aid.6 1 However, there is no guar-
antee that there exists a common theme that unifies the votes
that divide along a particular dimension.62 The challenge for
the analyst is to find the best interpretation of a dimension,
with the caveat that it may not be possible to identify a theory
that explains every vote.
An additional challenge is that any MDS solution is non-
unique in the sense that it can be rotated or reflected and still
preserve the distances in the original map. Thus, an analyst
must choose how to rotate and reflect the mapping, ideally to
make the result easiest to interpret. For example, MDS can
generate a map of cities using their pairwise distances, but the
algorithm will not know how to orient the north-south and
east-west axes. Such a geographic mapping is most useful
when rotated and reflected so that these axes are oriented ver-
tically and horizontally, respectively.
In many other contexts, however, there is no natural choice
for rotation and reflection. When scaling legislators or judges,
most applications of MDS and ideal point models define the
dimensions in terms of particular voters. One recent article, for
example, defined the first dimension as the Ginsburg-Scalia
58 See Poste & Patterson, supra note 52, at 274.
59 See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY AND CONGRESS 57-59
(2007) (describing the second dimension in Congress as corresponding to race-
related issues such as slavery and civil rights).
60 See Simon Jackman, Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Baye-
sian Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking, 9 POL.
ANALYSIS 227, 239 (2001) (finding a second dimension involving trade in the Sen-
ate in 1997 and 1998).
61 See Heckman & Snyder, supra note 40, at S 173-79 (finding that higher-
order dimensions in the House of Representatives in the 1970s and 1980s impli-
cated "agriculture, foreign aid, military spending, the debt ceiling, water projects,
abortion, and congressional reform").
62 See id. at S155 (observing that a dimension uncovered through scaling




axis.63 One issue with this approach is that it becomes un-
wieldy with multiple dimensions; it is difficult to know ex ante
which Justices should anchor the various dimensions. A sec-
ond issue is that the interpretation of each dimension hinges
critically on these choices. The first dimension would have a
somewhat different meaning, for example, if it were defined as
the Breyer-Thomas axis.6 4
Classical MDS differs from other scaling methods in that it
does not require the dimensions to be oriented by reference to
particular judges or legislators. The first dimension generated
is simply the dimension that explains the maximum amount of
variation in the Justices' votes. The second dimension explains
the maximum amount of residual variation after accounting for
the first dimension, and so forth. Of course, this approach
does not guarantee that the dimensions generated will be
meaningful. However, dimensions that explain the maximum
variation would at least be promising candidates for investiga-
tion, and this approach avoids arbitrarily choosing particular
Justices to orient the axes.
II
SCALING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN Two DIMENSIONS
A. Data
The data analyzed in this Article consist of all merits deci-
sions by the U.S. Supreme Court from the 1994 until the 2015
Terms. This period includes three prominent natural courts:
the last decade of the Rehnquist Court and two natural courts
under Chief Justice Roberts, constituting the 2005-2008
Terms and 2010-2015 Terms. The classical MDS algorithm
requires that each of these three periods be analyzed sepa-
rately, so that every pair of judges in each period votes in the
same cases.65
63 See Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 39, at 1692.
64 A more serious problem may occur in interpreting the subsequent dimen-
sions. For example, Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 39, rotated the MDS mapping
so that the first dimension coincided with the Ginsburg-Scalia axis and the sec-
ond dimension was perpendicular to that axis. See id. at 1692. One unfortunate
consequence of this rotation was that Justices Ginsburg and Scalia necessarily
had the same coordinates in the second dimension, by assumption. Thus,
whatever characteristic the second dimension represented, it must have been one
in which Justices Ginsburg and Scalia were precisely equal. This would be un-
likely for any meaningful policy or jurisprudential characteristic.
65 Shorter natural courts, such as the 2009 Term and the brief period be-
tween the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, are only ana-
lyzed in section II.B.2, supra, which identifies the second-dimension cases.
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The data on the Justices' votes are derived from the Su-
preme Court Database.6 6 The analysis is based on all cases
decided with a written opinion following oral argument.67 Dis-
agreement rates for all pairs of Justices were based on how
often they disagreed on the merits.68 Justices who join a ma-
jority or plurality opinion or who write concurring opinions are
coded as agreeing.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the three natu-
ral courts studied in this Article. There were a total of 1,557
cases during these three periods, 889 of which were
nonunanimous. There were also 97 cases that were not part of
these three natural courts.6 9 These are not analyzed in the
scaling diagrams but are considered in the following stage that
identifies cases that divide along the second dimension.
TABLE 1: SuMMARY STATISTIcS
Number of
Number of Nonunanimous
Time Period Cases Cases
1994-2004 Terms 872 492
2005-2008 Terms* 269 171
2010-2015 Terms 416 226
Total 1,557 889
* The 2005-2008 natural court excludes twenty-one cases at the beginning
of the 2005 Term before Justice Alito was confirmed.
B. Results
This section presents the results from the scaling analysis
of the Court from the 1994 through the 2015 Terms. It begins
by presenting two-dimensional scaling diagrams for the three
primary natural courts spanning this period, which reveal a
common two-dimensional structure for all three natural
courts. Next, this section identifies the cases that divide most
clearly along the second dimension. These cases are analyzed
66 The Supreme Court Database, supra note 37.
67 In the Supreme Court Database, these cases correspond to Decision Type =
1, 6, or 7. Id.
68 I conducted a separate analysis in which disagreement rates were calcu-
lated based on whether the Justices joined the same opinion. The results were
substantially similar.
69 Twenty-one of these cases were decided at the beginning of the 2005 Term,
after Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist but before Justice
Alito replaced Justice O'Connor. There were also seventy-six cases decided during
the 2009 Term, when Justice Sotomayor had replaced Justice Souter, but Justice
Kagan had not yet replaced Justice Stevens.
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in Part III of this Article, providing the basis for the claim that
the second dimension represents disputes over the boundaries
of authority.
1. Scaling the Three Natural Courts
Figure 3 provides classical scaling diagrams for three natu-
ral courts spanning the 1994-2015 Terms. The scaling al-
gorithm identifies positions for the Justices so that their spatial
distances approximate their disagreement rates as closely as
possible. The horizontal axis represents the first dimension;
this is the single dimension that best reflects their rates of
disagreement. The vertical axis is the second dimension, which
best captures the remaining disagreement unexplained by the
first dimension. Because these dimensions are determined
solely by the disagreement rates, they have no intrinsic sub-
stantive interpretation. As a general matter, dimensions de-
rived from such analysis can only be interpreted based on an
examination of the justices' positions in the cases that divide
along each dimension.
Each diagram is oriented so that the liberal Justices are on
the left and the conservatives are on the right. The vertical axis
in Figure 3 corresponds to the second dimension, which ex-
plains the maximum variation in the votes that are not ex-
plained by the first dimension. All diagrams are reflected
vertically so that Justice Breyer is above Justice Scalia. The
mappings are centered around the origin so that the average
coordinate in each dimension is zero.
The first dimension corresponds closely to the familiar po-
litical divide within the Court. For 1995-2004, the four liber-
als-Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter-form a
bloc on the left, with Justice Stevens a bit further to the left
than the others. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy occupy a
place in the middle of the left-right dimension, although closer
to the conservatives. Chief Justice Rehnquist is somewhat fur-
ther to the right, and Justices Scalia and Thomas are at the
extreme right. For 2005-2008, Chief Justice Roberts replaced
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Alito replaced Justice
O'Connor, but the positions of the remaining Justices barely
changed in the first dimension. For 2010-2012, Justice
Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter and Justice Kagan replaced
Justice Stevens, but the first-dimension alignment of the Court
remained stable.
The second dimension is also stable across the three natu-
ral courts. For the first two natural courts, Justices Ginsburg,
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Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas form a coalition below the
horizontal axis. In the 2010-2012 natural court, Justices Ka-
gan and Sotomayor eplace Justices Souter and Stevens in the
same coalition. Justice Breyer occupies the opposite position
in the second dimension in all three natural courts. He is
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in
1995-2004 and Justice Alito in the subsequent ime periods.
Chief Justice Roberts occupies a middle position during this
time period.
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There is relatively little drift in the second dimension. Jus-
tice Kennedy shifts from a moderate position from 1994-2004
to the upper part of the graph from 2005-2015. Justice
Thomas is very close to Justice Scalia from 1994-2008 but
moves toward the center of the second dimension from
2010-2015.
A casual examination of the graphs in Figure 3 shows that
the two-dimensional structure extracted from the classical
scaling algorithm is robust across time periods. The fact that
the orderings are stable in the second dimension suggests that
they are the product of meaningful phenomena. Further calcu-
lations, detailed in the Appendix, confirm that Justices' loca-
tions are significantly correlated across periods.70 The first two
dimensions are significant at the 1% level in all three natural
courts, while further dimensions fall far short of statistical
significance.71
The two-dimensional mappings in Figure 3 provide a differ-
ent perspective from one-dimensional models of the Court. The
first dimension captures almost all of the disagreement be-
tween the liberal and the conservative blocs of the Court. Ex-
cluding moderate Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the first
dimension explains 88-90% of the variance in voting behavior
between the liberal and conservative blocs for the three natural
courts, whereas the second dimension only explains 5-6% of
this variance.72 However, the second dimension explains
37-50% of the variance within the liberal and conservative
blocs, while the first dimension explains 11-16% of this vari-
ance.7 3  In the unidimensional view of the Court, Justice
Breyer is often described as the most moderate of the liberal
justices.7 4 In the two-dimensional model, Justice Breyer dif-
fers from the other liberals primarily along the second dimen-
70 See infra Appendix Table A2.
7' See infra Appendix Table Al.
72 See infra Appendix Table A3.
73 See id.
74 See, e.g., David G. Savage, How the Two Justices from California are Moving
the Supreme Court to the Left, L.A. TIMEs (June 29, 2016), https://www.la
times.com/nation/la-na-court-breyer-kennedy-center-20 160628-snap-story
.html [https://perma.cc/2E7W-SWJF] (describing Breyer as "the most moderate
of the court's four Democratic appointees"); David Cole, Justice Breyer v. The
Death Penalty, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/justice-breyer-against-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/6FAE-
VRFF] (describing Breyer as "the liberal Justice most likely to agree with his
conservative colleagues"); Charles Cameron & John Kastellec, How an Obama





sion. Similarly, the unidimensional model of the Court often
views Justices Scalia and Thomas as more extreme than Jus-
tice Alito. 75 In the two-dimensional model, these Justices differ
primarily along the second dimension.
Although the divide between liberals and conservatives in
the first dimension is instantly recognizable, the divide along
the second dimension is less familiar. A visual examination of
the top graph in Figure 3, detailing the 1994-2004 terms, con-
firms that it corresponds to the split in ApprendU6 and other
landmark cases about the constitutionality of sentencing en-
hancements. The majority coalition in Apprendi--Justices
Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas7 7-all have
negative coordinates in the vertical dimension. The dissent-
ers-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Kennedy,
and O'Connor-all have positive coordinates. However, this
divide appeared in a variety of other cases as well, many of
which did not involve sentencing. To develop a deeper under-
standing of the issues underlying the second dimension, the
next section outlines a procedure for identifying cases that
most strongly implicate this dimension.
2. Identifying the Second-Dimension Cases
The above findings show that the two-dimensional struc-
ture of the Court is significant and robust; some pairs of Jus-
tices consistently vote together more (or less) often than one
would predict using a one-dimensional model. These findings
thus generate an important question: what explains the divide
in the Court's second dimension? To investigate this question,
the next section begins by identifying those cases that divide
most clearly along the second dimension. Part III will then
analyze these cases to justify the hypothesis that it represents
disputes about the boundaries of institutional authority.
The preceding analysis was based purely on the Justices'
rates of disagreement. This section will examine the individual
votes in each case. The votes in each case are coded as a series
of ones and zeros, corresponding to whether each Justice votes
with the majority or dissent, respectively. I generate scores for
senate/?noredirect=ON&utmterm=.3effde7dd28c [https://perma.cc/5MXE-
ZK42] (describing Breyer as "the most moderate of the court's current liberals").
75 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially
Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws,
61 EMORY L.J. 737, 756 (2012) (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as "more
extreme conservatives" than Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito).
76 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
77 Id. at 468.
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each case along the first and second dimensions by taking the
absolute value of the correlation between the Justices' votes
and their coordinates in each dimension.7 8 For example, in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,7 9 the votes of
the conservative Justices in the majority are coded as ones,
while the liberal Justices' votes are coded as zeros. The first-
dimension score for Citizens United is .96, the correlation be-
tween the Justices' votes and their coordinates in the first di-
mension. The second-dimension score for Citizens United is
.10. Apprendi, by contrast, has a first-dimension score of .19
and a second-dimension score of .93. Thus, taking simple cor-
relations between votes and scaling coordinates provide a sim-
ple method for identifying cases that divide along each
dimension.
The fifty cases with the highest second-dimension scores
are listed in Appendix Table A4, along with their voting align-
ments.80 These cases have second-dimension scores exceeding
0.61. The votes are shaded to show the divides in the second
dimension. The coalition below the horizontal axis in Figure 3
is shaded gray; the coalition above the horizontal axis is de-
picted in white. Justices who did not vote in a case are crossed
out.
Certain areas of case law generated multiple second-di-
mension splits. Notably, there are twelve cases implicating the
jury trial right. Five cases involve the Fourth Amendment,
three involve the Confrontation Clause, three involve the inter-
pretation of criminal statutes, and two involve punitive
damages.
Calculating the dimension scores based on the Justices'
merits votes as coded in the Supreme Court Database ignores
much of the nuance in their written opinions. For example,
when a Justice concurs in part and dissents in part, the
Database classifies such votes either as concurring or dissent-
ing, based on the judgment of the coder. A more nuanced
examination would show that such opinions typically agree
78 This correlation is roughly analogous to a factor loading used in factor
analysis. For the purpose of calculating these scores, I use the weighted average
of the justices' coordinates across the three natural courts.
79 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
80 I omitted a few of these cases that had strong correlations in both dimen-
sions and exaggerated second-dimension scores due to the fact that some Jus-
tices had not participated. Three of these involved 6-2 or 5-2 votes with Justices
Scalia and Thomas in dissent. Another involved a 7-1 vote with Justice Breyer
dissenting in part. I also omitted Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), which
was dismissed as improvidently granted by a 6-3 vote with no majority opinion.
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with the majority on some issues and disagree on others. Simi-
larly, opinions concurring in the judgment disagree in some
significant way with the majority. In some instances, such
concurrences take positions that are much closer to the dis-
sent on key issues but disagree on some minor point that af-
fects the disposition of the case. In other instances, the vote is
unanimous as to the merits, but concurring Justices express
fundamental disagreement with the majority as to the reason-
ing in the case. Finally, some dissenting opinions use reason-
ing that is closer to the majority than to other dissenting
opinions but disagree with the majority on narrow grounds.
Coding such opinions purely on the basis of merits voting
sometimes misses coalitions that are similar to other divides
with high second-dimension scores. For the purposes of ex-
ploring different areas of case law, I simply coded such ambigu-
ous opinions alternatively as voting with the majority and the
dissent. If a case had a high second-dimension score either
way, I then examined whether the concurring opinion agreed
with the dissent on any important issue. I include some of
these cases in the subsequent discussions in order to better
illuminate the motivations that underlie the second dimension.
III
A THEORY OF THE SECOND DIMENSION
The scaling analysis in Part II revealed a robust two-dimen-
sional voting pattern within the Court. Because this analysis
was derived purely from the Justices' rates of disagreement, it
did not rely on any subjective judgments about the meaning of
particular votes. For the same reason, however, it also does
not explain what the dimensions represent. This Part of the
Article makes the case that the second dimension represents
disputes about the boundaries of institutional authority. Sub-
part III.A provides a brief overview of the first dimension, which
is often understood as a "political" dimension. Subpart III.B
discusses prior commentary on some of the cases that divide
along the second dimension, many of which characterized the
dimension as representing "formalism" versus "pragmatism" or
related concepts. It then shows why these explanations are
incomplete. Subpart III.B then explains the theory of the sec-
ond dimension as capturing differing philosophies about the
allocation of institutional authority. Part IV will then provide a
detailed discussion of the second-dimension cases to support
this theory.
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A. The First Dimension as a Political Dimension
The first dimension uncovered by the scaling procedure
corresponds to the familiar liberal-conservative divide and is
often viewed as a "political" dimension.8 ' Indeed, many of the
most politically charged cases in the last twenty years divided
along this dimension, with Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
serving as swing votes. This is true of many prominent deci-
sions involving abortion,8 2 gun control,8 3 gay rights,8 4 affirma-
tive action,8 5 election law,8 6 and the death penalty.8 7
Yet the characterization of the first dimension as "political"
is also incomplete. Many cases that divide along this dimen-
sion have low political salience. For example, in Wisconsin
Central Ltd. v. United States,8 8 the liberal and conservative
Justices split 5-4 regarding whether stock options granted to
employees should be taxable as "money remuneration" under
the Railroad Retirement Tax Act.8 9 In SAS Institute, Inc. v.
Iancu,9 0 the two factions divided over whether the Patent and
Trademark Office must review every claim raised by a peti-
tioner whenever it engages in inter partes review of a patent.9 '
Similarly, the two factions divided in Stem v. Marshall92 on the
constitutionality of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code author-
81 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299
(2016) (majority consisting of Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices); Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007) (majority consisting of five conservative
Justices).
83 See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 747 (2010) (majority consist-
ing of five conservative Justices); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 572
(2008) (majority consisting of five conservative Justices).
84 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015) (majority
consisting of Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 747 (2013) (majority consisting of Justice Kennedy and four liberal
Justices); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003) (majority consisting of
Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices).
85 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2204 (2016), (4-3 vote
with majority consisting of Justice Kennedy and three liberal Justices); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (majority consisting of Justice O'Connor and
four liberal Justices).
86 See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 533 (2013) (majority consist-
ing of five conservative Justices); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010)
(majority consisting of five conservative Justices); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100
(2000) (per curiam).
87 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 411 (2008) (majority con-
sisting of Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 554 (2005) (majority consisting of Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices).
88 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
89 Id. at 2069-70.
90 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
91 Id. at 1352-53.
92 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
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izing bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on state law
counterclaims.9 3 The left-right divisions in such cases do not
appear to be the product of crude political motivations.
Although a full exploration of the first dimension is beyond
the scope of this Article, one possible explanation is that Jus-
tices' interpretive methodology correlates with their political
values. In cases where the political stakes are low, interpretive
differences may generate left-right splits. In both Wisconsin
Central and SAS Institute, the conservative Justices interpreted
the statutes according to their plain meaning9 4 while the liberal
Justices looked to legislative purpose.9 5
Thus, the labeling of the first dimension as "political"
should be understood as a convenient shorthand. Many prom-
inent cases that divide along the first dimension implicate the
Justices' political values. Nevertheless, this dimension ap-
pears in a broad mix of cases, including some that have low
political salience.
B. Prior Commentary on Second-Dimension Cases
Although the second dimension has generated far less dis-
cussion than the first, some scholars have sought explanations
for the persistent alignments in cases involving areas such as
the jury trial right and the Confrontation Clause.9 6 Much of
the discussion treats these alignments as idiosyncratic, and
there has been little effort to provide a coherent explanation of
the Justices' motivations that applies across different doctrinal
areas.
Some commentators have characterized these coalitions as
representing a divide between rule-based decision making ver-
sus balancing. In a series of widely read online commentaries
on the Supreme Court, Walter Dellinger and Dahlia Lithwick
repeatedly described the divides in the jury trial and Confron-
tation Clause cases as representing "legalism" versus "pragma-
tism."9 7 Several academic and popular discussions of these
93 Id. at 467, 469.
94 See Wisconsin Central, 138 S. Ct. at 2074 (holding that a court should
interpret the words of a statute consistent with "their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute"); id. at 2076-78
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (considering Congressional purpose).
95 See SAS Institute, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (finding that "the plain text" of the
statute "supplies a ready answer"); id. at 1363 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the
text unclear and looking at "the likely purposes of the statutory provision").
96 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
97 See Walter Dellinger, Where Sotomayor Might Make a Real Difference, SLATE
(June 25, 2009 6:45 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2009/06/where-
sotomayor-might-make-a-real-difference.html [https://perma.cc/2QNX-SSZY]
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cases adopted similar formulations.9 8 Jeffrey Fisher, who ar-
gued several of these cases before the Supreme Court,9 9 has
described them as pitting "categorical rules" against a "balanc-
ing approach" to criminal procedure. 0 0 In the Fourth Amend-
ment context, Erin Murphy has argued that alignments in
cases implicating the warrant requirement represent "the clas-
sic divide between rules and standards."'0
The distinction between categorical rules and balancing
certainly captures an important aspect of the conflicting ap-
proaches taken by these two coalitions in criminal procedure.
The majorities in Apprendi and Blakely undeniably sought to
cast the jury trial right in a more categorical form, as did the
main opinion in Crawford for the confrontation right.10 2 The
dissents and concurrences opposing these holdings could like-
(describing divides in prominent confrontation and jury trial cases as generating
coalitions of two "conservative legalists" and three "liberal legalists" against four
.pragmatists"); Walter Dellinger, Showtime for the Supremes, SLATE (June 28,
2004 5:37 AM), https: //slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/06/showtime-for-
the-supremes.html [https://perma.cc/G7T9-BBWE] (describing the vote in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), as representing a "split between the
five legalistjustices and the four pragmatist justices" and observing the same split
in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003)); Dahlia Lithwick, Confrontations
Over a Clause, SLATE (June 23, 2011, 4:24 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/20 11 /06/confrontations-over-a-clause.html [https://perma.cc/P3SC-
RMYP] (describing coalitions in confrontation and jury trial cases as involving
legalism against pragmatism); Walter Dellinger, My Secret Plan, SLATE (June 24,
2002 5:51 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20030415054723/http://slate.
msn.com/id/2067003/entry/2067324/ [https://perma.cc/G7AT-X56X] (char-
acterizing the split in Apprendi v. New Jersey as between "the Legalists and the
Pragmatists").
98 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to
Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 983, 1011 (2008) (describing the divisions in the
sentencing guideline cases as between formalists and pragmatists); Bibas, supra
note 7, at 188 (contrasting Justice Scalia's formalism with Justice Breyer's prag-
matism in Sixth Amendment cases); Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The
Roberts Court Revanips the Rights of the Accused, 2008-2009 CATO Sup. Cr. REv.
223, 245 (describing the Apprendi vote as a split between formalism and pragma-
tism); Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 39, at 1709-13 (hypothesizing that some of
the Court's second dimension cases represent legalism versus pragmatism);
Siegel, supra note 9, at 575 n. 106 (describing the jury trial cases as implicating
"differences in methodology-specifically, legalism versus pragmatism"); Jeffrey
Rosen, Divide and Rule, NEW REPUBLIC (July 26, 2004) https://newrepublic.com/
article/67690/divide-and-rule-0 [https://perma.cc/87B6-DBAF] (describing
Hamdi and Blakely as generating a conflict between "pragmatists" and "legalists").
99 Fisher argued a number of prominent cases that divided along the second
dimension, including Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015); Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296 (2004); and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
100 See Fisher, supra note 7, at 1495-96.
101 Murphy, supra note 10, at 187.
102 See infra subpart IV.B.
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wise be considered cautious and pragmatic. Nevertheless, a
closer look at the broader set of cases reveals that the disagree-
ments are more complex than the common.explanation.
First, there are serious disputes regarding whether the ma-
jority holding in these cases can be accurately characterized as
rule-like. The principle underlying Apprendi and its progeny
has been criticized for being "opaque" and "incoherent,"1 03 and
the result in these cases was to overturn a rule-bound sentenc-
ing regime. As Judge Jeffrey Sutton has observed, "[o]ne might
think that legalists would have preferred the pre-Booker Guide-
lines regime" and "that pragmatists would have preferred the
standards of the post-Booker Guideline system."1 0 4 Frederick
Schauer has similarly described these jury trial and Confronta-
tion Clause holdings as expressing "hostility for rigid rules" and
a preference for "case-by-case development of the law."105 At a
minimum, proponents of rules could easily make arguments
for both sides in any of these cases, as could proponents of
balancing.
Second, a broader examination of the cases dividing along
the second dimension reveals several striking counterexamples
that are inconsistent with the rules-versus-balancing explana-
tion. In Arizona v. Gant, for example, the same majority as in
Apprendi overturned a longstanding clear rule that governed
vehicle searches of suspects incident to arrest, holding instead
that such searches must be evaluated under a reasonableness
standard. 106 In another Fourth Amendment case, Missouri v.
McNeely,10 7 a similar coalition rejected a per se rule permitting
warrantless blood tests for drunk driving suspects, insisting
instead on a "case-by-case evaluation of reasonableness."1 0 8
In both cases, the so-called pragmatists advocated bright-line
rules to give more guidance to law enforcement. Similarly, co-
alitions of "pragmatists" endorsed hard rules to limit punitive
damages, while the "formalists" were willing to tolerate wildly
103 Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System
be Saved? A Plea for the Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 217, 219 (2004); see also Benjamin J. Priester, FromJones to Jones: Fifteen
Years of Incoherence in the Constitutional Law of Sentencing Factfinding, 47 U.
TOL. L. REv. 413, 413 (2016) (describing the doctrine in the Apprendi line of cases
as "fraught with instability, unpredictability, and analytical incoherence").
104 Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008),
108 MICH. L. REv. 859, 874 (2010).
105 Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v Frederick,
2007 Sup. CT. REV. 205, 231.
106 556 U.S. 332, 333, 335 (2009).
107 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
108 Id. at 143-44, 158.
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unpredictable verdicts.10 9 The formalists, on the other hand,
have endorsed aggressive application of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, which has been criticized for being notoriously "un-
rule-like."' 1 0
Finally, many cases involving categorical rules and balanc-
ing split along the first dimension rather than the second. In
many prominent left-right splits during the last decade, com-
mentators have associated the conservative coalition with rule-
based decision making and the liberal coalition with balanc-
ing. 11 1 Liberal Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens joined
Justices Scalia and Thomas in many of these second-dimen-
sion cases, but they are more often associated with pragma-
tism and balancing.11 2 It would be odd to describe them as
"formalists" or "legalists."113
Thus, the characterization of the second dimension as in-
volving rules versus balancing or formalism versus pragmatism
is incomplete. Of course, no theory can possibly explain every
voting alignment in every case. The next section develops a
richer theory of the second dimension, which is based on differ-
109 See infra subpart IV.E.
110 Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction i the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REv. 591, 660 (1981); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that unconstitutional indefinite-
ness "is itself an indefinite concept"); Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a "Pointless Indignity", 66 STAN. L.
REv. 987, 998 (2014) (observing that "the constitutional test for vagueness is a
standard and not a rule").
111 See William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law
Project: First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REv.
821, 823-24 (2011) (describing the conservative majority in Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) as employing "rigid, categorical analysis" and the liberal
minority as taking a balancing approach to the First Amendment); Joseph
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendmerit Analysis,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 405-13 (2009) (describing the conservative majority in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as adopting a categorical
approach and the liberal dissent as adopting balancing).
1 12 See Charles L. Barzun, Justice Souter's Common Law, 104 VA. L. REv. 655,
703 (2018) (characterizing Justice Souter as a "holistic pragmatist"); Gregory P.
Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens's Free Speech Jurispru-
dence, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2201, 2201 (2006) ("If any single word can describe
Justice John Paul Stevens's approach to judicial decision making, the word is
'pragmatic.'"); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon,
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Defer-
ence Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1727, 1760 (2010) (describing Justice Ginsburg
as "pragmatic"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 90 (1992) (describing Justice Stevens as the pragmatist heir to
Justice Holmes).
113 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 184 (noting how Justices Stevens, Souter, and




ing approaches to drawing the boundaries of institutional
authority.
C. The Second Dimension: Disputes over the Boundaries
of Authority
Many of the cases that divide along the second dimension
involve disputes over the boundaries of institutional authority,
particularly involving juries, trial judges, and executive offi-
cials. These cases typically involve situations where institu-
tional actors have largely unconstrained authority within a
particular domain and disputes arise regarding the boundaries
of that authority. Some implicate authority to make purely
discretionary decisions, such as the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion or policymaking by states and agencies. Others in-
volve fact-finding by juries, which is subject only to limited
review. Finally, some of the decisions involve applying law to
facts in ways that require open-ended balancing or moral judg-
ment, such as assessing the reasonableness of a search or
determining the best interests of a child in a custody dispute.
Decisions in this last category are legal rather than discretion-
ary, but they are typically multifaceted inquiries based on par-
ticularized facts and are not easily scrutinized by appellate
courts. The disputes in all of these cases concern the proce-
dures that must be followed before these broad forms of au-
thority can be exercised.
The divisions in many of these cases can be characterized
as representing a divide between a formal versus a functional
approach to allocating institutional authority. Authority for-
malists view delegations of authority as imposing settlements
between competing interests and are reluctant to infer the un-
derlying purposes of these delegations or the best means of
achieving them. They are careful to avoid policy considerations
when determining the boundaries of authority in order to avoid
substituting their own policy views for those of the authorita-
tive actors. Thus, they tend to apply more literal interpreta-
tions to texts that allocate authority. When such texts are
ambiguous, they flesh them out in ways that maintain the
clarity and coherence of these boundaries.
The authority functionalists, by contrast, are more willing
to identify the substantive purposes served by institutional
delegations and interpret them in ways that promote those
purposes. They will not override clear limits on authority in
order to further controversial moral positions, but they are
more willing to find exceptions to such rules, especially when
2019] 1543
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
doing so would avoid an undesirable outcome. They are willing
to rely on their own moral views to determine which agent is
best suited to exercise government authority and which pre-
conditions must be met before such authority is exercised.
They interpret institutional texts more flexibly but are also
more willing to second-guess the exercise of such authority
after the fact.
Some of the disagreements that arise between authority
formalists and functionalists involve multiprong tests that
must be satisfied before an institutional actor can exercise
broad authority. The authority formalists view each prong as a
condition that must be independently satisfied, just as juris-
diction must be established before a court can consider the
merits of a lawsuit. The authority functionalists are more in-
clined to aggregate such prongs, treating them as factors to
weigh when determining whether such exercise of authority is
reasonable. In the Fourth Amendment context, for example,
the authority formalists view the requirements for a warrant
and probable cause as preconditions for determining whether a
search is reasonable. The authority functionalists view these
as factors to weigh in assessing reasonableness.
Although the empirical literature on judicial decision mak-
ing has paid scant attention to judges' views about institutional
authority, these considerations have long occupied a central
place in American public law. Arguably the most prominent
treatment comes from the legal process school, particularly the
teaching materials of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks that influ-
enced a generation of law students in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.1 14 Legal process jurisprudence is sometimes considered
passe, but it was in its heyday when many of the current and
recent Justices attended law school. In fact, several of the Jus-
tices studied with prominent figures in the legal process
movement. 115
114 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958)
(providing teaching materials for the "legal process" school of jurisprudence).
More recently, Richard Pildes has introduced a distinction between "institutional
formalism" and "institutional realism." See Richard H. Pildes, Institutional For-
malism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1-4.
Although Pildes's concepts bear some similarity to authority formalism and func-
tionalism, he focuses more on their application to the president, state courts and
legislatures, and Congress. See id. at 6. 12, 30, 36.
115 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal
Process, 107 HARV. L. REv. 2031, 2047 (1994) (noting that five recent Justices-
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-enrolled in the Legal Process
course at Harvard Law School); Adam J. White, The Burkean Justice, WEEKLY
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The divide between authority formalism and functionalism
mirrors the tension between two of the central concepts in legal
process jurisprudence: the principle of "institutional settle-
ment" and the requirement of "reasoned elaboration."16 For
the authority formalists, the principle of institutional settle-
ment is paramount. As Hart and Sacks wrote, this principle
"expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly ar-
rived at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought
to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and
until they are duly changed."'17 Legal judgments derive their
legitimacy from their conformity with "duly established proce-
dures," without regard to -any substantive conceptions of
morality.
The authority functionalists, by contrast, emphasize an-
other central feature of legal process jurisprudence: the view of
law as "a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the
basic problems of social living."s1 They evaluate legal judg-
ments less by their conformity with "duly established proce-
dures," but focus instead on whether they promote identified
social objectives. There are limits to such functionalism; these
Justices will not typically override clear rules in order to reach
a result they perceive as socially beneficial. However, when
institutional provisions have ambiguities, they will be more in-
clined to ascribe social purposes to such rules and interpret
them in ways that further those purposes.
Indeed, many of the cases that generate divides along the
second dimension involve conflicts between these rationales.
For the authority formalists, procedural rules and institutional
allocations serve an important settlement function. They are
STANDARD (July 18, 2011), https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/the-
burkean-Justice [https://perma.cc/8S6A-EEDW] (describing how Justice Alito
was influenced by Alexander Bickel, a prominent legal process scholar).
116 See Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99
VA. L. REv. 1, 30 (2013) (noting the "tension between (a) Hart and Sacks's insis-
tence that courts interpret directives in a way that best fulfills their underlying
substantive purposes and (b) their suggestion that the chief purpose of law is to
provide clear and settled terms for social living"); William N. Eskridge. Jr. & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form,
89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 724 (1991) (noting that the "emphasis on institutional
competence and proceduralism, if carried too far, might undermine the very idea
that leads off the Hart and Sacks materials-the purposiveness of law as a way to
facilitate our social interdependence"); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 614-15 (1999) (describing these two concepts as the "twin
pillars" of the legal process school and discussing the tension between purposive
interpretation of texts and "apurposive rule-following" implicit in the principle of
institutional settlement).
117 HART & SACKS, supra note 114, at 4.
118 Id. at 148.
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more inclined to resolve conflict about the meaning or applica-
tion of law by following "duly established procedures."'1 9 How-
ever, there may be ambiguities about the procedures
themselves or the limits of the delegated authority. In such
circumstances, the authority functionalists will go beyond text
to consider social purposes and policy implications. By con-
lt trast, the authority formalists will avoid such considerations in
order to avoid infringing upon the authority of actors exercising
delegated authority.
The authority divide typically arises when there is ambigu-
ity about the scope of an institutional delegation, such as jury
fact-finding or open-ended determinations of reasonableness
by trial judges. The authority formalists are most concerned
with ensuring that these actors have satisfied the relevant pre-
conditions and that they have stayed within the textually de-
limited bounds of their authority. The authority functionalists
are less willing to parse texts to determine an agent's authority
and more willing to consider whether the delegation of power is
sensible and properly exercised. These divides occur most
often when one interpretation of an ambiguous text is sup-
ported by common sense, so that the authority functionalists
are not divided on policy grounds. In such cases, the authority
formalists will be more concerned about interpreting texts and
precedent to ensure that the boundaries of authority remain
clear.
A number of these cases also involve conflicts between
maintaining clear lines of authority and concerns about pro-
portionality. As a substantive concern, proportionality neces-
sarily requires the exercise of moral judgment across multiple
cases. Because juries, prosecutors, and trial judges do not
participate in a representative sample of cases, they are ill
equipped to make such judgments. Authority functionalists
are more willing to interpret the limits of authority flexibly in
order to serve the broader goal of promoting proportionality,
especially in sentencing and determining damages. Authority
formalists are willing to tolerate some disproportionality in or-
der to preserve clearly delineated spheres of discretion for au-
thorized institutional actors.




CASES THAT DEFINE THE AUTHORITY DIVIDE
This Part provides a detailed discussion of the cases in
which the Justices divide most clearly along the second dimen-
sion. Although this diverse group of cases implicates different
legal sources and policy considerations, they have a common
theme: they all implicate debates about how to interpret legal
texts defining the boundaries of institutional authority. Of
course, it is impossible to know whether these issues were
pivotal in each of these cases. My claim is that the authority
theory provides a coherent yet parsimonious explanation for
these recurring voting alignments.
Before proceeding to the cases, a few caveats are worth
emphasizing. The analysis is based primarily on the Justices'
written opinions in these cases. While these opinions provide
insight into the Justices' motivations, the Justices do not re-
veal all of their motivations in written opinions. Nor can one
justification always be distilled from a single opinion; Justices
often supply a variety of reasons in support of their holdings.
Although the authority theory fits many of these cases, it is
certainly possible that some of the alignments were the result
of idiosyncratic motivations. There are also divides that cannot
readily be explained by reference to boundaries of authority; no
single theory can explain every voting alignment. Even the first
dimension, which is widely recognized as a "political" or "ideo-
logical" dimension, appears in many cases that are not readily
explained in terms of their political implications. 120
Finally, the following analysis examines the cases that im-
plicate the authority divide but cannot answer why other cases
do not divide along the same lines. At times, the Justices may
perceive political values as outweighing concerns about the
boundaries of authority. Without objective measures of sali-
ence for each dimension, it is difficult to explain why particular
cases divide one way versus the other.
The following subparts discuss the cases, organized by
doctrinal category. In order to provide background and coher-
ence to the discussion of the doctrinal categories, I include
some relevant cases that fall below the 0.61 threshold used to
identify the top fifty cases with the highest second-dimension
scores. A more careful reading of these related cases also
reveals additional instances of ambiguous votes that are not
coded as such in the Supreme Court database. For example, in
120 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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Arizona v. Gant,121 Justice Scalia issued a concurring opinion
in which he explicitly disagreed with the majority's reasoning,
but stated that he was joining the majority in order to produce
a majority opinion.1 2 2 In several cases, Justices issue opinions
that could be described as "grudging concurrences," where
they reiterate opposition to a precedent but agree to follow it. 123
In the following discussions of voting alignments, I code such
votes as ambiguous.
A. The Right to a Jury Trial
The most prominent line of cases to implicate the authority
divide are those involving the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial. For the authority formalists, the Sixth Amendment pre-
served the role of the jury in finding all facts that were neces-
sary to establish a criminal offense. Traditionally, judges could
find facts that were only relevant for determining an offender's
sentence. In theory, this could lead to an evisceration of the
jury trial right if a defendant's sentence could be radically in-
creased based on a sentencing factor determined by a judge.
To avoid this, the authority formalists concluded that any fact
that increases a defendant's maximum sentence must be es-
tablished by a jury. The authority functionalists, by contrast,
took flexible positions on the jury trial right whenever it could
interfere with the fair administration of criminal justice.
Although not a sentencing case, Neder v. United States1 24
exemplifies the conflict between these two coalitions. The de-
fendant was convicted of tax fraud after making false state-
ments to the Internal Revenue Service.12 5 It was undisputed
that the materiality of the defendant's false statements was an
element of the offense and that the district judge had erred in
failing to submit this element to the jury. However, the district
judge ruled that the omission was harmless error and a major-
ity of the Supreme Court agreed.
121 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
122 See id. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2166-67 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating his con-
tinued disagreement with Apprendi but arguing that it should be applied to mini-
mum as well as maximum sentences); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,
515 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting arguments based on prior holdings
that he believed were erroneous).
124 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
125 See id. at 4.
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TABLE 2: JURY TRIAL CASES IMPLICATING THE AUTHORITY DIVIDE
a 5 2nd Dim.
a ~w a oTerm Case Name w Score
1997 Almendarez-Torres v. U.S. 0.71
1997 Monge v. California 0.71
1998 Jones v. U.S. 0.93
1998 Neder v. U.S. 0.51/0.71
1999 Apprendi v. New Jersey 0.93
2001 Harris v. U.S. 0.69
2001 Ring v. Arizona 0.61/0.88
2003 Blakely v. Washington 0.93
2004 U.S. v. Booker (merits) 0.93
2004 U.S. v. Booker (remedy) 0.81
2004 Shepard v. U.S. 0.94
2nd Dim.
Term Case Name I 0 Score
2006 Cunningham v. California 0.86
2008 Oregon v. Ice 0.48
a 2nd Dim.
Term Case Name Score
2011 Southern Union v. U.S. 0.86
2012 Alleyne v. U.S. * 0.30/0.67
2015 Hurst v. Florida 0.52/0.83
Note: Gray cells represent votes in the authority formalist coalition. White cells
represent votes in the authority functionalist coalition. Crossed-out cells re-
present Justices who did not participate. Asterisks represent votes on alternative
grounds; alternative second-dimension scores are given for cases with ambiguous
votes.
Writing for a majority of authority functionalists, Chief
Justice Rehnquist conceived of the jury trial right as instru-
mental, interpreting it in light of its purpose of promoting accu-
rate verdicts. He found that the government's evidence clearly
established the materiality of the defendant's false statements
and that the defendant had not argued otherwise.12 6 He con-
126 See id. at 16.
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cluded that no reasonable jury could conclude that the state-
ments were not material.1 2 7
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Souter,12 8 viewed the jury trial right as structural rather than
instrumental. He argued that a judge cannot determine that
an element of an offense has been satisfied-even when it is
obvious-just as a judge does not have the authority to direct a
guilty verdict for a clearly culpable defendant.1 2 9 Scalia ob-
jected to the notion that harmless error analysis could apply,
observing sarcastically, "[tihe Court's decision today is the only
instance I know of ... in which the remedy for a constitutional
violation by a trial judge (making the determination of criminal
guilt reserved to the jury) is a repetition of the same constitu-
tional violation by the appellate court."o3 0 For the dissent, the
question was not about determining the defendant's guilt; it
was about protecting the jury's authority to make this
determination.
Both sides used similar reasoning in a series of cases ad-
dressing whether statutory provisions authorizing criminal
punishment were offense elements or sentencing enhance-
ments. Each was decided by a 5-4 vote, with Justice Thomas
serving as the swing Justice. The authority functionalists pre-
vailed in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,13 1 upholding a
provision that permitted a judge to increase a defendant's sen-
tence if the defendant had a prior conviction for an "aggravated
felony."l 3 2 The same coalition prevailed in Monge v. Califor-
nia,'3 3 holding that the determination that a defendant com-
mitted a prior "serious felony" was a sentencing enhancement
for double jeopardy purposes.1 3 4 In both cases, the authority
formalists would have found the provisions to be offense ele-
ments that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. In both cases, they would have applied constitutional
avoidance, arguing that judicially determined facts that raise a
defendant's maximum sentence would raise constitutional dif-
127 See id.
128 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He agreed with most of the
reasoning of the dissent but would have held that the jury's verdict did in fact
include a finding of materiality. See id. at 26 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
129 See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130 Id. at 32.
131 523 U.S. 224 (1998)
132 See id. at 226.
133 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
134 See id. at 724.
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ficulties. Justice Thomas switched sides13 5 to give the author-
ity formalists a majority in Jones v. United States.13 6 They held
that a provision of a federal carjacking statute that increased
penalties for causing "serious bodily injury" was an offense
element that must be submitted to a jury.13 7 Again, the au-
thority formalists applied constitutional avoidance without di-
rectly addressing the scope of the jury trial right.
Apprendi v. New Jersey3 8 involved a statute that in-
creased the defendant's sentencing range because the judge
determined that he had committed a hate crime. The same
majority coalition as in Jones explicitly held what it had only
previously suggested: any fact that increases a defendant's
sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 9
The holding in Apprendi raised concerns about the consti-
tutionality of the U.S. sentencing guidelines and many state
guidelines. Most guidelines systems permitted judicial fact-
finding in order to tailor sentences more closely to the particu-
lar circumstances of the offense. As Justice Breyer argued in
an influential article14 0 and again in his Apprendi dissent, 141
permitting judges to find sentencing facts promotes proportion-
ality and efficiency in sentencing. As Justice Breyer observed,
it would be awkward for a defendant to argue that he did not
sell drugs, but if he did, it was only 100 grams.14 2 In response,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Justice Breyer "sketches an
admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice" but
contended that the jury trial guarantee was intended to provide
135 Justice Thomas later repudiated his vote in Almendarez-Torres, see Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring), and
repeatedly called for it to be overruled. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,
28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the court should reconsider
Almendarez-Torres); Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1202 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging the Court to overrule
Almendarez-Torres); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 279 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (attributing the Court's difficulties in
interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act to its failure to reconsider Al-
mendarez-Torres).
136 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999).
137 See id. at 251-52.
138 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000).
139 See id. at 490. This holding did not include facts relating to prior convic-
tions. See id. at 496.
140 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSrRA L. REV. 1, 13-14, 31 (1988).
141 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142 See Breyer, supra note 140, at 10.
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a check on the state in the administration of criminal
justice. 1 4 3
In Blakely v. Washington,14 4 the same majority invalidated
the Washington State sentencing guidelines. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion argued that the jury trial right is not a "mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power
in our constitutional structure" that "is meant to ensure [the
people's] control in the judiciary."4 5 By contrast, Justice
O'Connor's dissent emphasized the role that guidelines sys-
tems serve in promoting uniformity and proportionality and
reducing racial disparity in sentencing.146
In Booker,14 7 the same majority found the same constitu-
tional violation in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Given the
similarity between the U.S. Guidelines and the Washington
guidelines at issue in Blakely, the holding was expected. The
remedial portion of Booker, however, included a surprising
twist: Justice Ginsburg switched sides to join the authority
functionalists in holding that two provisions of the Guidelines
could be severed, thus preserving the Guidelines in advisory
form. Although Justice Ginsburg did not give any reasons for
her switch, it is not as puzzling as it first appears, given that
she is a relative centrist in the authority dimension.
B. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, like the
jury trial right, often implicates the authority divide. Indeed,
many commentators have observed the similarity of the align-
ments in these two lines of cases.148 This similarity is not
coincidental; it derives from a debate about whether procedural
rights for criminal defendants should be conceived as alloca-
tions of power or as means of promoting accuracy and fairness.
The Confrontation Clause states that "[1]n all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."' 4 9 On its face, the Confronta-
tion Clause does not directly implicate issues of institutional
authority. Although it mandates certain procedures for testi-
143 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
145 Id. at 306.
146 See id. at 316-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147 540 U.S. 220 (2005).
148 See Barkow, supra note 7; Bibas, supra note 7; Fisher, supra note 7.
149 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1552 [Vol. 104:1513
POLITICS AND AUTHORITY
mony and cross-examination, it does not govern whether juries
or judges should make factual findings.
Questions of institutional authority arise, however, in de-
fining the contours of the confrontation right. The authority
functionalists generally interpret the confrontation right in
light of its goal of promoting the reliability of testimony in crim-
inal cases. The authority formalists, however, conceive the
confrontation right as procedural. Although they do not dis-
pute the underlying purpose served by the clause, they reject
interpretations of the confrontation right that hinge on judicial
determinations of reliability. If judges could dispense with the
confrontation right whenever they deemed testimony to be suf-
ficiently reliable, they would infringe upon the power of juries
to evaluate the credibility of testimony.





Term Case Name a n 0" Score
2004 Crawford v. Wash. F F 0.00/0.61
2nd Dim.
Term Case Name I 0 f Score
2007 Giles v. California Ll= [f h 0.28/0.37
2008 Melendez-Diaz v. Mass. OH 0.92
0
2nd Dim.
Term Case Name A a Score
2010 Michigan v. Bryant 0.52/0.76
2010 Bullcoming v. N.M. 0.92
2011 Williams v. Illinois 0.69/0.92
2014 Ohio v. Clark * * * 0.00/0.64
Note: Gray cells represent votes in the authority formalist coalition. White cells
represent votes in the authority functionalist coalition. Asterisks represent votes




Prior to 2004, the Court followed a functionalist approach
to the Confrontation Clause established in Ohio v. Roberts,15 0
which carved out an exception to the confrontation right if a
judge determined that the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of
reliability.'" 15 1 In Crawford v. Washington,152 the Court over-
ruled Roberts.15 3 Justice Scalia's opinion acknowledged that
the "Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence,"
but he emphasized that "it is a procedural rather than a sub-
stantive guarantee."5 4 He argued that the framers did not
believe that judges "could ... be trusted to safeguard the rights
of the people" and that they were "loath to leave too much
discretion in judicial hands."5i 5 From this perspective, the
clause does not merely promote accuracy, but rather deter-
mines which institutional actors have the authority to assess
accuracy. Echoing his earlier dissent in Neder,15 6 Justice
Scalia connected his reasoning on the confrontation right and
the jury trial right: "Dispensing with confrontation because tes-
timony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty."' 5 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, vigorously disagreed
with the Court's decision to overrule Roberts.15 8 He argued
that the Confrontation Clause should be viewed as a "func-
tional right" whose purpose is to "flesh out the truth," and not
merely an "empty procedure."'5 9
Justice Scalia's opinion, however, left many questions un-
resolved about the scope of the Clause. It held that the Clause
does not apply to all out-of-court statements, but only to those
that constitute "testimony," meaning a "solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact."'6 0 Because the statements at issue in Crawford
were clearly testimonial, the Court left "for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimo-
150 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
151 Id. at 66.
152 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
153 See id. at 68.
154 Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 67.
156 See supra notes 128-26 and accompanying text.
157 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
158 See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
159 Id. at 74.




nial.'"161 The inquiry was distinct, however, from whether the
statement was reliable. 162
Chief Justice Rehnquist died and Justice O'Connor retired
shortly after Crawford, so one might have expected the remain-
ing Justices to have maintained their cohesion regarding the
Confrontation Clause. Instead, the Crawford coalition quickly
unraveled in a series of cases that required the Court to flesh
out the limits of the confrontation right. Two prominent cases
involved the admissibility of statements made by murder vic-
tims, while another three addressed whether the confrontation
right applied to statements made by technicians in forensic
laboratories. These cases tested the commitment of the Jus-
tices when the scope of the confrontation right diverged too far
from its rationale.
In Giles v. Califorria, s6 3 the defendant fatally shot his ex-
girlfriend but claimed that he had acted in self-defense.1 6 4
During his trial, the prosecution introduced statements made
by the victim to police following a domestic violence incident
three weeks before the shooting. 1 6 5 The defendant challenged
his murder conviction on the grounds that the admission of
these unconfronted statements violated the Confrontation
Clause. 166 The California Supreme Court rejected his claim on
the ground that he had forfeited his confrontation right as a
result of his own wrongdoing.16 7
The Supreme Court rejected the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception to the Confrontation Clause.16 8 Justice Scalia's ma-
jority opinion held that this exception only applies when the
defendant has engaged in conduct whose purpose is to prevent
testimony by the witness.16 9 He argued that a narrow interpre-
tation of the exception was necessary to "avoid a principle re-
pugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury: that those
murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty ... should
be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from theirjudge-
determined wrong."170 He explicitly rejected any judicial in-
161 Id at 68.
162 See id. at 61.
163 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
164 See id. at 356.
165 See id. at 356-57.
166 See id. at 357.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 377.
169 See id. at 359-68.
170 Id. at 374 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Justices Ginsburg and
Souter did not join this part of Justice Scalia's opinion, but articulated similar
views in a separate concurrence:
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quiry into the purposes of the Confrontation Clause: "It is not
the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth
Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its
guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts' views)
those underlying values."17 1
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Stevens, argued that it was unwise "to reach firm conclusions
about the precise metes and bounds of a contemporary forfei-
ture exception by trying to guess the state of mind of 18th-
century lawyers."172 He emphasized the moral implications of
the forfeiture exception over the institutional implications, ar-
guing that "an examination of the forfeiture rule's basic pur-
poses and objectives indicates that the rule applies here,"173
and that the majority's interpretation "cannot be squared with
the exception's basically ethical objective."17 4 He also claimed
that the majority's holding would violate proportionality by
granting procedural benefits to more culpable defendants that
would be unavailable to less culpable defendants.17 5
The authority functionalists prevailed in Michigan v. Bry-
ant, 7 6 in which a shooting victim gave a detailed statement o
police before succumbing to his wounds. 177 The defendant ob-
jected to the admission of the victim's statement as uncon-
fronted testimony.178 Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion
held that the statement was admissible, observing that the
victim was in a dire medical state and the gunman was still at
large, so the statement would "enable police assistance to meet
an ongoing emergency."'7 9 In several passages, her opinion
also sought to reestablish a role for reliability in determining
admissibility.' 0 Justice Scalia issued a notably sharp dis-
If the victim's prior statement were admissible solely because the
defendant kept the witness out of court by committing homicide,
admissibility of the victim's statement o prove guilt would turn on
finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the ab-
sence . . . . Equity demands something more than this near circu-
larity before the right to confrontation is forfeited ....
Id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 375 (plurality opinion).
172 Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 384.
174 Id. at 387.
175 See ic at 388-89.
176 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
177 See i. at 349.
178 See id. at 350.
179 Id. at 356 (quoting Davis. v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
180 See id. at 358-59.
[Vol. 104:15131556
POLITICS AND AUTHORITY
sent,18 1 objecting to reliability as a factor in determining ad-
missibility and accusing the majority of trying to "resurrect
Roberts" without saying So.18 2
Three cases addressed whether the confrontation right ap-
plies to scientists who conduct forensic analyses. In Meiendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 's 3 the defendant objected to the admis-
sion of documents from a state laboratory certifying that a
powdered substance found in defendant's possession was in
fact cocaine, where the technician did not testify and was not
available for cross-examination. 18 Writing for a five-Justice
majority of authority formalists, Justice Sdalia described the
case as a "straightforward application of our holding in Craw-
ford."'8 5 Because the documents were testimonial in nature
and prepared for the purpose of establishing defendant's guilt
at trial, they were barred by the Confrontation Clause.'8 6 In
his dissent, Justice Kennedy offered many criticisms of the
majority opinion, most of which were variants of the claim that
it imposed substantial burdens on the criminal justice system
for very little gain in reliability.'8 7 The Court splintered along
similar lines in two subsequent cases involving the admissibil-
ity of unconfronted testimony by laboratory analysts. ' 8 8
Ohio v. Clark'8 9 involved the admissibility of statements
made by a three-year-old child-abuse victim to his preschool
teacher.19 0 Although the Justices agreed that the testimony
should be admitted, they disagreed sharply about the meaning
of the Confrontation Clause. Writing for a six-Justice majority
of mostly authority functionalists, Justice Alito's opinion en-
dorsed considerations of reliability' 9 ' and the relevance of
hearsay rulesl9 2 in determining admissibility. Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with Justice Alito's holding
181 See id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg dissented sepa-
rately but agreed with most of Scalia's reasoning. See id. at 395 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
182 Id. at 393 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
184 See id. at 308-09.
185 Id. at 312.
186 See d. at 310-11.
187 See id. at 339 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Williams v. Illinois,
567 U.S. 50 (2012).
189 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
190 See id. at 2177-78.
191 See i at 2180-81.
192 See id. at 2180.
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but objected strenuously to the passages in the majority opin-
ion that he described as efforts to weaken Crawford.19 3
C. The Fourth Amendment
The authority divide also appeared in several prominent
Fourth Amendment cases, most of which involved exceptions
to the warrant requirement. Several of these cases generated
alignments that were identical to alignments in the confronta-
tion and jury trial cases.194 Erin Murphy has noted similar
alignments in cases involving the warrant requirement, sug-
gesting that they represent he divide between rules and stan-
dards.19 5 In fact, the pattern is more complex. The authority
formalists are categorical about the warrant requirement but
apply the exceptions to the warrant requirement as standards.
The authority functionalists take the reverse position, treating
the requirement itself as a standard but the exceptions as
categorical.
193 See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I write separately
... to protest the Court's shoveling of fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in Crawford." (citation
omitted)).
194 For example, the voting alignments in two Fourth Amendment cases, Mary-
land v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013), and Navarette v. Calfornia, 572 U.S. 393
(2014), were identical to the alignment in Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), a
Confrontation Clause case. The vote in another Fourth Amendment case, Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was identical to the vote in another Confrontation
Clause case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). The Gant
majority was the same majority as in Apprendi and Blakely, the prominent jury
trial cases. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 333.
195 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 4: FOuRTH AMENDMENT CASES IMPLICATING THE
AUTHORITY DIVIDE
2nd Dim.
Term Case Name s 1 4A Score
2008 Ahron v. Gant 0./9
p. a
Term Case Name 2nd Score
2012 Flridoa v. Jadnes O.92
2012 Missouri v. McNeely 0.56/0.69
2012 Maryland v. King O.69
2013 Navarette v. Calif. O.69
2015 Utah v. Strieff 0.63
Note: Gray cells represent votes in the authority formalist coalition. white cells
represent votes in the authority functionalist coalition. Crossed-out cells re-
present Justices who did not participate. Asterisks represent votes on alternative
grounds; alternative second-dimension scores are given for cases with ambiguous
votes.
For the authority functionalists, the central consideration
is the reasonableness of the search, determined by balancing
the government's law enforcement interests against the privacy
interests of the individual.1 The presence of a warrant and
individualized suspicion are merely factors to consider within
this general reasonableness inquiry. Thus, the authority fune-
tionalists support broader exceptions to the warrant require-
ment when it conflicts with practical policing concerns. They
are similarly less concerned about the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion, considering it as merely one factor to be con-
196 This interpretation corresponds to a view, often repeated in the academic
literature, that the clauses are disjunctive. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-43 (1969); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 759 (1994) (observing that the
words of the Fourth Amendment "do not require warrants, probable cause, or
exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be
reasonable").
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sidered in weighing reasonableness and not as a categorical
prerequisite.
The authority formalists, by contrast, treat the warrant
and individualized suspicion requirements as separate condi-
tions that must be satisfied before a judge can proceed to an
open-ended determination of reasonableness.197 They also in-
terpret the established exceptions to the warrant requirement
narrowly. From their perspective, the warrant requirement has
important institutional implications, because it ensures that
the search be reviewed ex ante by a neutral magistrate and
"narrowly limited in its objectives and scope."19 8 This review is
especially important given that redress for illegal searches is
often inadequate. On the other hand, delays in obtaining a
warrant may hinder legitimate law enforcement activity, even
when searches would otherwise be reasonable.
These cases fit the pattern of the authority divide because
they implicate the power of police to conduct searches and
magistrates to issue warrants, and also because the standards
for the legality of searches-reasonableness, individualized
suspicion, and probable cause-are amorphous. Although
these are legal judgments, unlike the factual findings in the
jury trial and Confrontation Clause cases, they are not amena-
ble to a precise definition 99 and are "not readily, or even use-
fully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."200 They are legal
judgments that can be reviewed on appeal, but their particular-
ized nature means that they are not as closely bound by prece-
dent as other legal judgments.2 0 1  Because these
determinations are so open-ended, the authority formalists
may be more concerned about preserving the role of the inde-
pendent magistrate in setting limits on searches.
197 This interpretation corresponds to the view that the Reasonableness and
Warrant Clauses are conjunctive. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 358 (1974) (observing that the Court
has held that Fourth Amendment reasonableness encompasses the commands of
the Warrant Clause and that the Court has often condemned warrantless
searches).
198 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989).
199 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (stating that the
meaning of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" cannot be precisely
articulated).
200 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
201 See Ornelas, 517 U.S., at 698 (observing that holdings on individualized
suspicion and probable cause will rarely serve as useful precedent for other cases
"because the mosaic which is analyzed . .. is multi-faceted").
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One of the most prominent exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement applies to searches of suspects incident to arrest.2 0 2
In 1981, the Court extended this exception to searches of sus-
pects' vehicles.2 03 In Arizona v. Gant, the Court limited this
exception, holding that the warrant exception is not categorical
and applies only when the justifications for the warrant excep-
tion apply.2 04
Justice Stevens, writing for a coalition of authority formal-
ists, emphasized the narrowness of the exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.2 05 He acknowledged the exception for a
search "incident to a lawful arrest[,]" which "derives from inter-
ests in officer safety and evidence preservation."206 He rejected
the application of this exception when it was divorced from its
rationale.207 In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving
with a suspended license and handcuffed in the back of a po-
lice car before officers searched his vehicle.2 08 Clearly, neither
justification for the warrant exception applied: there was no
threat to the officer's safety and the vehicle search could not
provide any evidence for the charged offense.20 9
In his dissent, Justice Alito criticized the majority for re-
jecting a clear rule that would have provided better guidance to
law enforcement.210 Interestingly, the authority functionalists
favored a clear substantive rule governing searches incident to
arrest, while the authority formalists endorsed a standard
based on reasonableness.2 1 1 For the authority formalists, the
202 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1969) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment permits police to search arrestees and areas within reaching
distance in order to remove weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence).
203 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (holding that it was
constitutional to search a suspect's car incident to arrest).
204 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
205 See id. at 338 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))
(holding that warrantless searches are "subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions").
206 Id. at 338.
207 See id. at 339 (holding that the exception for searches incident to arrest
does not apply when "both justifications for [it] are absent").
208 See id.
209 See id. at 343 (arguing that to "read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search
incident to every recent occupant's arrest would . . . untether the rule from [its]
justifications").
210 See id. at 355-56 (contending that the majority's holding "may endanger
arresting officers" and "confuse law enforcement officers and judges").
211 See id. at 351 (concluding that warrantless searches are permissible "only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest"); see also id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that if founding-era
practices "provide inadequate guidance" about the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, then the Court should "apply traditional standards of reasonableness").
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primary concern appeared to be preserving independent review
by a magistrate or judge for probable cause.2 1 2 The authority
functionalists, by contrast, were willing to weaken the warrant
requirement in order to provide clearer guidance to police.
2 13
Missouri v. McNeely2 14 presented a similar conflict about
the scope of the warrant requirement, this time involving the
exigency exception for imminent destruction of evidence.
2 15 At
issue was whether the metabolization of blood alcohol consti-
tutes a "per se exigency that justifies an exception to
the ... warrant requirement."2 1 6 Emphasizing the narrowness
of the warrant exception,2 17 the intrusiveness of a blood
test,2 1 8 and the importance of requiring approval by an inde-
pendent magistrate,2 19 Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion
rejected a per se exception. She acknowledged that blood alco-
hol continually dissipates but held that the exigency exception
must nevertheless be based on the totality of the circum-
stances, weighing the exigency against the delay in applying for
a warrant.2 20
As in Gant, the authority functionalist dissenters favored a
clear substantive rule, claiming that the majority's rule would
fail to provide adequate guidance for police.2 21 Once again, the
authority formalists endorsed a balancing test that preserved a
larger role for independent review.22 2
In Maryland v. King,223 police took a DNA test of the defen-
dant as part of the standard booking procedure after he was
arrested for assault.2 24 This test linked him to a prior rape, for
212 See id. at 338 (majority opinion).
213 See id. at 360 (Alto, J., dissenting).
214 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
215 See id. at 145.
216 Id.
217 See id. at 148 ("Our cases have held that a warrantless search of the
person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception.").
218 See id. (observing that "an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an indi-
vidual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy'") (quoting Win-
ston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
219 See ic (emphasizing the "importance of requiring authorization by a 'neu-
tral and detached magistrate'") (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948)).
220 See id. at 156 (rejecting per se exception and holding that exigency "must
be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances").
221 See id. at 166 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("A police officer reading this
Court's opinion would have no idea-no idea-what the Fourth Amendment re-
quires of him . . . .").
222 See cL at 157 (majority opinion).
223 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
224 See id. at 440.
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which he was convicted.225 The defendant challenged the rape
conviction on the ground that the warrantless DNA swab vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.226
The Court split 5-4, with Justice Thomas switching sides
to form a majority of authority functionalists. Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion minimized the importance of a warrant
and individualized suspicion,227 emphasizing that "the ulti-
mate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search
is 'reasonableness."'2 28 He then proceeded to a totality-of-the-
circumstances evaluation of reasonableness.2 2 9 For the defen-
dant's interests, he noted the minimal intrusiveness of a cheek
swab230 and the diminished expectations of privacy for ar-
restees.23 1 On the government's side, he focused on the inter-
est in identifying arrestees, analogizing DNA testing to
fingerprinting.2 3 2 He found that the government interest easily
outweighed the defendant's.233
In dissent, Justice Scalia contended that the requirement
of individualized suspicion "lies at the very heart of the Fourth
Amendment" and is "categorical and without exception."234 He
rejected the majority's balancing approach, arguing that "sus-
picionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is
ordinary crime-solving."2 35 He also ridiculed the government's
interest in identifying arrestees,23 6 noting that the defendant's
DNA sample was matched to the prior crime four months after
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 447 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
560-61 (1976)) (stating that "the Court has preferred 'some quantum of individu-
alized suspicion .. . [as] a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure'" but
that such suspicion is not an "irreducible requirement").
228 Id. (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
229 See id. at 448 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))
("This application of 'traditional standards of reasonableness' requires a court to
weigh 'the promotion of legitimate governmental interests' against 'the degree to
which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy.'").
230 See id. at 461.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 456-61. Justice Kennedy made only glancing reference to what
was the obvious government interest: identifying the perpetrators of past un-
solved crimes. However, he mentioned this interest only in the context of provid-
ing the possible benefit of "freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same
offense." Id. at 455.
233 See id. at 465-66.
234 Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 469.
236 Id. at 466 ("The Court's assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve




his arrest, long after his bail hearing.23 7 Whereas the majority
subsumed the requirement of individualized suspicion within
the broader reasonableness inquiry, the dissent treated it as
separate constraint on the power of police to search suspects.
D. Interpreting the Scope of Criminal Statutes
The authority divide appeared in several cases interpreting
the scope of broad criminal prohibitions. Many of these cases
implicated the principle of legality, which forbids the retroac-
tive creation of crimes,238 and two related doctrines, the rule of
lenity and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. These doctrines are
widely understood to serve multiple purposes. First, they pro-
vide fair notice to potential offenders about the consequences
of their conduct.239 Second, they ensure that legislatures, and
not judges, determine which acts are criminal.2 40 Third, they
establish limits on the authority of police and prosecutors.24 1
The second and third rationales relate directly to questions
of institutional authority. The second rationale promotes the
separation of powers by requiring that the power to define
crimes be vested in the legislature and not the judiciary.242
The third rationale is especially relevant, given the open-ended
discretion exercised by prosecutors and police.2 4 3 Insofar as
"[t]he power to define a vague law is effectively left to those who
enforce it,"244 these doctrines provide a curb against arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement.2 4 5 If "the definition of [a] crime
237 See id. at 472.
238 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968)
(defining the principle of legality to require that "conduct may not be treated as
criminal unless it has been so defined by an authority having the institutional
competence to do so before it has taken place").
239 See id. at 84-85 (stating that the "first argument hat is always advanced in
support of the principle of legality" is "that people are entitled to fair notice of what
the law requires so that they may plan their lives accordingly").
240 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[Blecause of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually rep-
resents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity."): John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness,
and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 202-05 (1985) (dis-
cussing separation-of-powers rationales for the principle of legality).
241 See PACKER, supra note 238, at 88 (arguing that "the real importance of the
principle of legality" is "to control the discretion of the police and of prosecutors");
Jeffries, supra note 240, at 215 (describing how the principle of legality can
constrain police and prosecutorial discretion).
242 See Jeffries, supra note 240, at 202.
243 See id. at 197.
244 Id. at 215.
245 See PACKER, supra note 238, at 89-90 (arguing that "the most important
single device" for ensuring that prosecutors and police conduct themselves in a
manner that is "fair, evenhanded, and rational" is the requirement that they
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is sufficiently vague and elastic[,]"24 6 there may be little mean-
ingful constraint on the power of police to stop, search and
arrest suspects or on the power of prosecutors to issue
indictments.247
As a general matter, the authority formalists are more in-
clined to apply the rule of lenity or the vagueness doctrine in
cases involving ambiguous criminal statutes. They also tend to
read criminal prohibitions in a morally detached manner, look-
ing primarily to text and precedent to determine whether it
provides adequate specificity. This may be due to the fact that
they are more concerned with the second and third rationales
for the legality doctrines; they view statutory text as providing
formal limits on prosecutors and police.
"confine their attention to the catalogue of what has already been defined as
criminal").
246 Id. at 98.
247 See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the
Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REv. 2051, 2075 (2015) (noting that the require-
ment of probable cause for arrest "would break down if police had the authority to
observe behavior, make up a crime to cover it, and then make an arrest because
they had probable cause that the invented crime occurred in their presence").
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TABLE 5: STATUTORY CRIMINAL CASES IMPLICATING THE
AUTHORITY DIVIDE
0
S ~ 2nd Dim.
Term Case Name so Score
1997 Caron v. U.S. 0.63
2004 Rogers v. Tenn. 0.37/0.72
0)
a~ 2nd Dim.
Term Case Name so a w 1 a4 0 o Score
2006 James v. U.S. 0.8
2008 U.S. v. Santos 0.92/0.70
%4 2nd Dim.
Term Case Name '0 4 Score
2010 Sykes v. U.S. _ 0.57
2011 Reynolds v. U.S. 0.45
2012 Descamps v. U.S. 0.53
2014 Johnson v. U.S. * * 0.52/0.23
2014 Yates v. U.S. * 0.53/0.21
Note: Gray cells represent votes in the authority formalist coalition. White cells
represent votes in the authority functionalist coalition. Asterisks represent votes
on alternative grounds; alternative second-dimension scores are given for cases
with ambiguous votes.
Although all Justices will consider statutory text, context,
and prior precedent, the authority functionalists are more will-
ing to look to moral considerations, public policy, or legislative
intent. The contrasting approaches may stem partly from em-
phasis on different rationales for the legality, lenity, and vague-
ness doctrines. If the primary concern is fair notice, then there
is a case for applying moral judgment; an important considera-
tion for fair notice is whether the conduct is generally recog-
nized as wrongful.248 The authority formalists, however, are
248 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (stat-
ing that strict construction of a criminal statute "is particularly appropriate" when
"the act underlying the conviction .. . is by itself innocuous"); see also ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., supra note 11, at 694 ("Under a fair warning rationalization, the rule of
lenity is most appropriately applied to criminal statutes that create offenses that
are malum prohibitum (bad only because they are prohibited) rather than matun
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less willing to rely on moral considerations in determining the
scope of criminal offenses, viewing statutory text instead as the
most legitimate form of notice.249
If the primary concern is enforcing limits on police and
prosecutors, Justices might be justifiably hesitant to exercise
moral judgment in interpreting those limits. To say that lenity
should apply because the defendant is insufficiently culpable,
or because the prosecutor is seeking penalties disproportionate
to the offense, would arguably infringe upon prosecutorial dis-
cretion. This may explain why the authority formalists rigor-
ously enforce textual limits on the scope of criminal offenses
but tend to avoid moral considerations in their analysis.
One example of this divide occurred in United States v.
Santos,250 which addressed whether the operation of an illegal
gambling ring also constituted money laundering.25 1 This de-
pended on whether the term "proceeds" in the statutory text
meant "receipts" or "profits."252 The former, more expansive
interpretation, would cover defendants' conduct; the latter in-
terpretation would not.
The same majority as in Apprendt applied the narrow inter-
pretation, although Justice Stevens concurred separately.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion engaged in a rather cursory
examination of the statutory text and context and found both
interpretations to be plausible.2 53 He rejected any considera-
tion of Congressional purpose254 and proceeded quickly to the
rule of lenity, holding that "the tie goes to the defendant."2 5 5
in se (bad by their very nature)."); Jeffries, supra note 240, at 231 (arguing that
the "fair notice" rationale is weakest with regard to "obviously wrongful conduct"
and that the "real source of notice" is "the customs of society and the sensibilities
of the people").
249 See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that it is a legal fiction
that "the words of the United States Code or the Statutes at Large give adequate
notice to the citizen" but contending that this "fiction descends to needless farce
when the public is charged even with knowledge of Committee Reports"); Yates v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1099 n.6 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[When
an ordinary citizen seeks notice of a statute's scope, he is more likely to focus on
the plain text than ... on the section number, the superfluity principle, and the
noscLtur and ejusdem canons.").
250 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
251 See id. at 510.
252 See id.
253 See id at 513-14.
254 See d. at 515.
255 Id. at 514.
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Justice Scalia briefly mentioned the notice and separation-
of-powers rationales for the rule of lenity,256 but elaborated in
more detail on the third rationale. He noted that the broader
definition of "proceeds" sought by the government would dra-
matically expand the scope of the offense, causing many forms
of unlawful activity to merge with money laundering.257 This
would greatly expand prosecutorial authority258 and give pros-
ecutors additional leverage in plea bargaining,259 where their
discretion is largely unchecked.2 60 Writing in dissent for a coa-
lition of authority functionalists, Justice Alito contended that
interpreting the statute to apply to "receipts" rather than "prof-
its" better served the main purposes of the statute: limiting the
ability of criminals to benefit from their illegally obtained funds
and inhibiting the growth of criminal enterprises.26 1
Several authority divides arose in a series of cases involv-
ing the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 26 2 which provides
for sentence enhancements for "career offenders" who commit
felonies while using a firearm. Many of these cases2 6 3 con-
cerned ACCA's "residual clause," which deemed any offense to
be a "violent felony" if it "is burglary, arson, or extortion, in-
volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another."264
Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
struggled to interpret this language, in part because of the
Court's prior holding that an offense could only be considered a
"violent felony" as a categorical matter, without regard to the
particular facts of the crime.265 In the early ACCA cases, the
authority functionalists relied on social science and common
sense to determine whether offenses were sufficiently harmful
256 See id. (explaining that the rule of lenity "vindicates the fundamental prin-
ciple that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose
commands are uncertain" and "keeps courts from making criminal law in Con-
gress's stead").
257 See id. at 516.
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See id.; see also id. at 524-28 (Stevens, J., concurring) (striking a middle
ground by considering legislative history before applying the rule of lenity).
261 See id. at 535-36 (Alito, J., dissenting).
262 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
263 A few cases, such as Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15-16 (2005),
concerned the procedures by which courts could establish that a prior offense
constituted a violent felony.
264 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
265 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
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to constitute violent felonies, whereas the authority formalists
focused primarily on the statutory text.2 6 6
James v. United States2 67 addressed whether attempted
burglary constituted a violent felony.268 Writing for an author-
ity functionalist majority, Justice Alito answered in the affirma-
tive, relying primarily on common sense to conclude that
attempted burglary posed roughly the same risk of injury as
actual burglary.269 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Souter,2 70 argued that the rule of lenity required the
residual clause to be construed narrowly.2 7 1 He further sug-
gested that the majority's approach, which entailed "leaving it
to the courts to apply the vague language in a manner that
is ... highly unpredictable," could violate "the constitutional
prohibition against vague criminal laws."2 7 2
Sykes v. United States273 considered whether intentional
vehicular flight from a law enforcement officer constituted a
violent felony under ACCA. Once again, the authority function-
alists prevailed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. Relying
both on common sense and detailed crime statistics, the major-
ity argued that vehicular flight posed greater risk of injury than
burglary and was roughly as dangerous as arson.2 7 4
In a solo dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority's
reliance on crime statistics as "untested judicial factfind-
ing."275 He argued further that the majority' reliance on crimi-
nology research exacerbated the vagueness of the statute
because it made the definition of "violent felony" depend on a
court's interpretation of the literature.2 7 6 He would have de-
clared the residual clause of ACCA void for vagueness, con-
tending that it fails to "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of its reach" and "permits, indeed invites, arbitrary
enforcement. "277
266 See infra notes 267-94 and accompanying text.
267 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
268 See id. at 195.
269 See id. at 203.
270 Justice Thomas dissented separately, contending that the statute relied on
judicial fact-finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. See id. at
231-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271 See id. at 219 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272 Id. at 230.
273 564 U.S. 1 (2011).
274 See id. at 8-10; see also id. at 19-21 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (providing further citations to criminology studies and news reports demon-
strating the hazards of vehicular flight).
275 Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276 See id. at 31-33.
277 Id. at 34.
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Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented sepa-
rately. Focusing primarily on the elements of the statute and
the broader statutory scheme, she concluded that the state
provision that the defendant violated should not be considered
violent as a categorical matter in light of more serious vehicular
flight offenses in the state criminal code.2 78
Four terms later, Justice Scalia's solo dissent was trans-
formed into a six-Justice majority, with Justice Breyer and
Chief Justice Roberts joining the authority formalists. Al-
though the Court granted certiorari in Johnson v. United
States2 79 to determine whether unlawful possession of a short-
barreled shotgun constituted a violent felony under ACCA, 280
Justice Scalia's majority opinion declared the residual clause
void for vagueness.281 In so holding, he wrote that the "indeter-
minacy of the wide-ranging inquiry ... both denies fair notice
to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges."28 2
Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred only in the judgment,
arguing that the case could have been resolved under the
Court's existing ACCA case law.2 8 3 Justice Alito dissented,
contending that any vagueness could be cured by interpreting
the residual clause to apply to "real-world conduct" rather than
to categorical offenses.28 4
Another lenity case, Yates v. United States2 85 produced a
similar division within the Court, but the factions were re-
versed from the prior cases: a coalition of mostly authority
functionalists applied lenity, while a coalition of mostly author-
ity formalists would have upheld the conviction. The defendant
in Yates was a commercial fisherman who had instructed a
crew member to throw undersized fish overboard in order to
destroy evidence of fishing violations. He was convicted under
Section 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which made it
a crime to "knowingly . .. destroy[ ] . . . any record, document,
or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influ-
ence" a federal investigation.2 8 6
278 See id. at 38-48 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
279 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
280 See id. at 2556.
281 See icL at 2557.
282 Id.
283 See id. at 2564-65.
284 See id. at 2578-80 (Alito, J., dissenting).
285 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
286 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002).
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By a 5-4 vote, the Court overturned the conviction. Writ-
ing for a plurality dominated by authority functionalists,287
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that a fish is literally a tangible
object2 88 but limited the statutory definition to tangible objects
that can be "used to record or preserve information."289 Nota-
bly, her opinion repeatedly alluded to the perceived excessive-
ness of the twenty-year maximum penalty.2 90 She also held
that the rule of lenity required the narrower definition.29 1
Justice Kagan's dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas, focused on the statutory text. She argued
that the term "tangible object" was "broad, but clear,"2 9 2 so the
rule of lenity did not apply.2 9 3 She suggested that the plurality
opinion had been motivated by the "disproportionate penalties"
sought by the prosecution and more generally, "overcriminal-
ization and excessive punishment" in federal law.2 9 4 She
agreed that section 1519 was a "bad law," but that the Court
lacked authority to rewrite it.2 95
Of the seven Justices who participated in both Santos and
Yates, only Justice Ginsburg applied lenity in both, and only
Justice Kennedy opposed lenity in both. The reason for the
ostensible reversal may have been that the defendant in Yates
had a plausible moral claim that his prosecution was dispro-
portionate but a weaker textual claim, while the defendant in
Santos had a stronger textual claim but a weaker moral claim.
E. Punitive Damages
Many cases involving punitive damages also generated au-
thority divides. As a general matter, the authority formalists
reject constitutional limits on excessive punitive damages,
while the authority functionalists endorse a role for federal
287 Justice Ginsburg has mostly sided with the authority formalists in these
cases, as shown in Table 2. See infra Table 2. Her opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at
1076.
288 See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079.
289 fJL
290 See id. at 1085 n.6 (noting that a broader interpretation of § 1519 covered
all of the conduct already proscribed by § 2232(a), which only has a five-year
maximum); id. at 1087-88 (distinguishing a similar text in a provision of the 1962
Model Penal Code that applies to all physical evidence on the grounds that this
provision describes a misdemeanor); id. at 1087 (noting that the fish caught by
defendant were no longer even illegal at the time of his prosecution).
291 See id. at 1088.
292 Id. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
293 See id. at 1098-99.
294 Id. at 1100.
295 Id. at 1101.
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courts to review such verdicts for reasonableness. The voting
alignments, however, do not fit as closely as some of the other
areas of case law discussed in previous sections. Justice Sou-
ter, who reliably sided with authority formalists in cases involv-
ing the jury trial and confrontation right, consistently sided
with authority functionalists on punitive damages. Justice
Stevens did as well in several earlier cases before returning to
the authority formalist side. In two cases, Justices Scalia and
Thomas join an authority functionalist majority on grounds of
stare decisis, although they maintained disagreement with the
prior holdings. Nevertheless, the Court as a whole followed a
similar pattern in these cases.
TABLE 6: PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES IMPLICATING THE
AUTHORITY DIVIDE
2nd Dim.
Term Case Name M' , Score
1996 BMW v. Gore 0.43
2001 Cooper v. Leatherman * j*L 0.19/0.62
2003 State Farm v. Campbell [ T] 0.62
2i v a a 2nd Dim.
Term Case Name 5 ' 4 Score
2006 Philip Morris v. Williams 0.8
2007 Exxon Shipping v. Baker * -*I * 0.20/0.78
Note: Gray cells represent votes in the authority formalist coalition. White cells
represent votes in the authority functionalist coalition. Crossed-out cells re-
present Justices who did not participate. Asterisks represent votes on alternative
grounds; alternative second-dimension scores are given for cases with ambiguous
votes.
Under the common law, juries possessed wide discretion to
assess punitive damages,296 which were reviewable for reason-
ableness by state trial and appellate courts.297 Starting with
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,298 the Court recognized
constitutional limits on punitive damages, holding that a $4
296 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1991) (discussing
wide discretion historically exercised by juries in determining punitive damages).
297 See id. at 15.
298 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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million verdict was excessive for failing to disclose that a new
car had been repainted prior to sale.
In Gore, Justice Stevens joined the authority functionalists
and Justice Rehnquist joined the authority formalists, al-
though both switched sides in subsequent cases. Echoing the
authority functionalist view on lenity,299 Justice Stevens's ma-
jority opinion stated that "[ellementary notions of fairness" re-
quire that "a person receive fair notice ... of the severity of the
penalty that a State may impose."30 0 The defendant lacked fair
notice because the system could generate awards that were
grossly disproportionate to the harm.3 0 1
Justice Stevens discussed three considerations for deter-
mining whether a punitive damages award violated due pro-
cess, all of which required the exercise of moral judgment: the
"degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, the ra-
tio of the punitive damages award to the actual harm, and the
penalties imposed for comparable misconduct.3 0 2 In dissent,
Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution did not authorize
federal judges to engage in reasonableness review of punitive
damages awards.30 3 He emphasized the institutional role of
the jury as "the voice of the community"30 4 and criticized the
majority for giving its own moral judgment "priority over the
judgment of state courts and juries."30 5 In a separate dissent,
Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for "ventur[ing] into
territory traditionally within the States' domain."3 0 6
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,so7 the Court held that
juries cannot award punitive damages for injury to "other per-
sons not before the court."30 Writing for a majority of author-
ity functionalists, Justice Breyer emphasized the need to
"cabin the jury's discretionary authority" to prevent "arbitrary
punishments" and provide the defendant with "fair notice."30 9
Allowing punishment for nonparty victims would compromise
299 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
300 Id. at 574.
301 See id. at 574-75.
302 Id. at 575.
303 See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What the Fourteenth Amendment's
procedural guarantee assures is an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a
damages judgment in state court; but there is no federal guarantee a damages
award actually be reasonable.").
304 Id. at 600.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
307 549 U.S. 346 (2008).
308 Id. at 350.
309 Id. at 352.
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these objectives by "add[ing] a near standardless dimension to
the punitive damages equation."310
Exxon Shipping Co. v. BakeT0n involved a challenge to a
$2.5 billion punitive damages award against Exxon for its role
in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The Justices divided along both
the political and authority dimensions on different issues, pro-
viding a striking illustration of the Court's two-dimensional
structure. Unlike the prior cases, Exxon Shipping arose under
federal maritime law rather than constitutional due process, so
the Court reviewed the punitive damages award as a common
law court.3 1 2 Because there was no controversy about the
Court's authority to modify the award,3 13 the questions about
institutional authority presented in the prior cases were less
salient in Exxon Shipping.3 14
Whether the damages were excessive was essentially a
value judgment, so it is perhaps unsurprising that the Justices
divided primarily along the political dimension on this ques-
tion. Justice Souter joined four of the conservatives in the
majority while the remaining liberals dissented.3 1 5 Justice
Souter's majority opinion analogized punitive damages to inde-
terminate criminal sentences, noting the potential for dispro-
portionate outcomes in the absence of limits.3 1 6 He cited the
success of sentencing guidelines to justify a hard limit on puni-
tive damages in maritime cases,3 17 fixing the maximum ratio
for punitive to compensatory damages at 1: 1.318
Justice Souter's opinion hinted that the same reasoning
could also apply in cases involving constitutional due pro-
cess.3 19 In fact, some lower courts have applied the common
310 Id. at 354.
311 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
312 See id. at 489-90.
313 See id. at 502 ("Our review of punitive damages today .. considers not
their intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as
a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a source of
judge-made law in the absence of statute.").
314 In separate dissents, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens both agreed that the
Court had the authority to craft a rule limiting punitive damages in maritime suits
but argued that it should nevertheless have let Congress decide whether to set
limits. See iL at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 523 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
315 Justice Alito did not participate.
316 See id. at 504-06 (majority opinion).
317 See id.
318 See id. at 513.
319 See id. at 490 (stating that Exxon's challenge of the award under maritime
law "goes to our understanding of the place of punishment in modem civil law and
reasonable standards of process in administering punitive law"); id. at 515 n.28
(suggesting that the constitutional limit on punitive damages may coincide with
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law reasoning of Exxon Shipping to constitutional cases.320
Once the implications of the majority opinion ventured beyond
maritime law, however, the Justices splintered around issues
of jury authority. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the ma-
jority, but expressed their continued opposition to constitu-
tional limits on punitive damages.321 In his dissent, Justice
Breyer endorsed the majority's 1:1 ratio on punitive damages
as a general matter, but argued that a "limited exception" was
warranted due to Exxon's egregious conduct.322 The Justices
who endorsed the suggestion that a 1:1 ratio would be appro-
priate in constitutional cases were the same as the majority in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams (aside from Justice Alito, who was
recused). Similarly, the Justices who had dissented in Williams
declined to endorse the application of hard limits on punitive
damages in constitutional cases.
F. Additional Examples
Many of the cases that generated authority divides impli-
cated common areas of doctrine, such as the jury trial right,
the Confrontation Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the princi-
ple of legality, and punitive damages. Nevertheless, a few cases
in unrelated areas also generated alignments that fit the same
pattern and also involved questions about the boundaries of
institutional authority. These examples are useful because
they show that disputes about authority are not limited to par-
ticular doctrinal areas or substantive issues.
1. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers32 3 addressed
whether former railway workers experiencing asbestos-related
illness could recover damages under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) for pain and suffering associated with their
the common law limit announced in the majority opinion); Thomas B. Colby,
Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of
Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 458 n.292 (2008) (interpreting the Court's
opinion in Exxon Shipping as offering guidance to state courts in constitutional
cases involving punitive damages); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Liti-
gation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 33
(2009) (observing that Exxon Shipping presented "a platform for the Court to
provide a template for state appellate courts (and lower federal courts)-an ana-
lytic framework for punitive damages excessiveness review that could be emulated
by other courts typically sitting as common law courts").
320 See Sharkey, supra note 319, at 33-34 & 32 n.33 (discussing examples).
321 See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
322 Id. at 525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
323 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
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fear of developing cancer.324 Ayers resembles some of the prior
cases in that the determination of damages for pain and suffer-
ing involves an "unguided exercise of discretion," both for the
jury and the reviewing court.3 2 5 In this sense, Ayers implicates
concerns that were present in the punitive damages cases.32 6
In two prior FELA cases, the Court had addressed the need
for limits on emotional distress claims due to the "very real
possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for de-
fendants."3 27 The Court recognized emotional injury claims
under FELA when the plaintiff had "sustain[ed] a physical im-
pact" or had been "placed in immediate risk of physical harm"
by the defendant's negligent conduct,3 28 but denied recovery
for mere exposure to a carcinogen.329
At the time the Court heard Ayers, asbestos litigation and
the prospect of massive liability had forced many manufactur-
ers into bankruptcy.3 30 As a result, there was a concern that
physically unimpaired plaintiffs seeking damages for emotional
distress could deplete the funds available for plaintiffs who
later develop cancer or other asbestos-related iseases.3 31
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the same majority of author-
ity formalists as in Apprend, rejected any distinct treatment for
asbestos cases under FEIA, arguing that "[clourts . . . must
resist pleas . . . to reconfigure established liability rules be-
cause they do not serve to abate today's asbestos litigation
crisis."3 3 2 She held that the categorical distinction established
in the prior FEILA cases was sufficient to cabin the jury's
discretion. 333
324 See id. at 140.
325 Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001).
326 See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849, 881 (1998) (describing both punitive damages
and pain-and-suffering awards as "highly variable and frequently capricious").
327 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546 (1994).
328 Id. at 547-48.
329 See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997).
330 See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 169 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "[alsbestos litigation hald] driven 57 companies ...
into bankruptcy" at the time the Court heard Ayers).
331 See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-
Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 393 (1993) (estimating that roughly one-
half of asbestos claims had been filed by unimpaired plaintiffs and observing that
these claims "inevitably divert[ ] legal attention and economic resources away
from" the most deserving plaintiffs).
332 Ayers, 538 U.S. at 166 (majority opinion).
333 See id. at 157 (observing that the categorical approach established in the
prior cases "serves to reduce the universe of potential claimants to numbers
neither unlimited nor unpredictable." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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In the principal dissent, Justice Kennedy contended that
the majority's holding thwarted the primary purpose of FELA-
to provide compensation for injured employees.3 3 4 Citing the
numerous bankruptcies due to asbestos litigation,3 3 5 Justice
Kennedy argued that the majority's holding would generate
disproportionate awards for plaintiffs with mild injuries that
could deplete the funds available for those who incur serious
harms.3 3 6 He also questioned the competence of juries to esti-
mate damages relating to harms for fear of future disease, ar-
guing that such awards would be based on uninformed
speculation. 3
2. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl33 8 addressed the application
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to a custody dispute
between a couple seeking to adopt a baby girl and her Cherokee
biological father. Like other cases dividing along the authority
dimension, Adoptive Couple involves a quintessentially open-
ended determination: the best interests of the child.3 39 Be-
cause this test is discretionary and susceptible to bias,340 it
historically led to unwarranted removal of Indian children from
their families.341 ICWA, which was enacted to combat this
334 Id. at 167 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is common ground that the purpose
of FEIA is to provide compensation for employees protected under the Act. The
Court's decision is a serious threat to that objective." (citation omitted)).
335 See id. at 168.
336 See id. at 170 ("As a consequence of the majority's decision, it is more likely
that those with the worst injuries from exposure to asbestos will find they are
without remedy because those with lesser, and even problematic, injuries will
have exhausted the resources for payment."); see also id. at 185-86 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[lt would be perverse to apply tort law's basic compensatory objec-
tives in a way that compensated less serious injuries at the expense of more
serious harms.").
337 See id. at 179 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is beyond the ability of juries to
derive from statistics like these a fair estimate of the danger caused by negligent
exposure to asbestos. . . If instructing a jury to calculate an increased risk of
cancer invites speculation, then asking the jury to infer from its estimate a rough
sense of the fear based on the risk invites speculation compounded.").
338 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
339 See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1987) (describing the best interests test as indetermi-
nate); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975) (characterizing
the best interests test as "usually indeterminate and speculative").
340 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587,
643-44 (2002) (describing best interests analysis in state courts as "highly discre-
tionary and potentially biased" against Native Americans).
341 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 11.01 (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2017), LexisNexis (describing studies showing that 25-35% of Indian children
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bias,342 governs which institutional actors-state courts or tri-
bal courts-will determine a child's best interests. ICWA also
imposes strict preconditions before state courts can apply the
best-interests test to remove a child from an Indian family.
In custody cases involving Native American children, ICWA
vests jurisdiction in tribal courts for children domiciled on res-
ervations3 43 and otherwise allows Native American parents and
tribes to petition for transfer to tribal courts.3 4 ICWA also
provides Native American families and tribes with procedural
and substantive rights in cases that are adjudicated in state
courts. In particular, ICWA prevents state courts from remov-
ing Native American children from their families unless "con-
tinued custody" would result in "serious emotional or physical
damage to the child" and requires the state to provide remedial
efforts prior to removal.3 45 However, state courts have some-
times resisted enforcing these requirements, especially when
technical distinctions involving domicile or tribal eligibility
would otherwise override the court's view of the. child's best
interests. 346
In Adoptive Couple, the birth mother arranged for the girl to
be adopted by a couple in South Carolina after the Cherokee
biological father relinquished his parental rights.34 7 The bio-
logical father subsequently contested the adoption, arguing
that ICWA prevented termination of his parental rights absent
a determination that the girl would suffer "serious emotional or
physical damage" in his custody.348
The Supreme Court voted 5-4 in favor of the adoptive
couple, dividing along the same lines as in two Fourth Amend-
ment cases34 9 and one Confrontation Clause case.350 Justice
Alito's opinion for an authority functionalist majority carved
out two narrow exceptions to ICWA in cases where the Indian
parent had not previously had custody of the child. Relying on
the phrase "continued custody" in the statute, the majority
held that the father's parental rights could be terminated be-
had been removed from their families in the years preceding the enactment of
ICWA).
342 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4)-(5) (2012).
343 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012).
344 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012).
345 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)-(f) (2012).
346 See Atwood, supra note 340, at 590 & 687 n. 14.
347 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 643-44 (2013).
348 See id. at 645.
349 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013); Navarette v. California, 572
U.S. 393 (2014).
350 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012).
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cause he had not previously had custody.3 5 1 Similarly, there
was no need to provide remedial services because there was no
family to break up.3 5 2
Much of the language in Justice Alito's opinion manifested
antipathy toward the categorical limits ICWA imposes on the
consideration of a child's best interests. He repeatedly empha-
sized that the baby girl was only 3/256 Cherokee,353 even
though he acknowledged that her membership in the Cherokee
nation was "undisputed."3 5 4 He repeatedly cited facts that im-
pugned the biological father's fitness as a parent3 5 5-facts that
would have been relevant to a determination of the child's best
interests-but never explained how these were relevant to the
application of ICWA. Although many of these statements were
dicta, they reflected opposition to separating the substantive
issues in this case from the questions about decision-making
authority.
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for
undermining the coherence of the statute, which she viewed as
striking a balance between the authority of state and tribal
courts. She argued that the majority's interpretation of ICWA
resulted in an "illogical" discrepancy between procedural and
substantive protections under the Act.356 Thus, the majority
"transform[ed] a statute that was intended to provide uniform
federal standards . .. into an illogical piecemeal scheme."35 7
The dissent viewed ICWA as a statute that determined who
decides such disputes involving Indian children and the proce-
dures by which these disputes are litigated. Justice Sotomayor
criticized the majority for its "repeated, analytically unneces-
351 See Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 647-50.
352 See id. at 651-52.
353 See id. at 641 ("This case is about a little girl ... who is classified as an
Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee."); id. at 646 ("It is undisputed that,
had Baby Girl not been 3/256 Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no
right to object to her adoption under South Carolina law."); id. at 655 (arguing
that ICWA impedes adoption of Indian children "solely because an ancestor-even
a remote one-was an Indian.").
354 Id. at 642 n.1.
355 See id. at 643 (observing that the father relinquished his parental rights in
a text message); icL at 644 (noting that "[flor the duration of the pregnancy and the
first four months after Baby Girl's birth, Biological Father provided no financial
assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl, even though he had the ability to do so"
and he "made no meaningful attempts to assume his responsibility of parenthood
during this period" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
356 Id. at 674 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Having assumed a uniform federal
definition of 'parent' that confers certain procedural rights, the majority then
illogically concludes that ICWA's substantive protections are available only to a
subset of 'parent[s]' . . .
357 Id. at 670.
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sary references to the fact that Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee"
and for "second-guess[ing] the membership requirements of
federally recognized Indian tribes."3 5 8 These criticisms insinu-
ated that the majority was influenced by the balance of the
equities in this case and not merely the question of decision-
making authority.3 59
G. Conclusion
The cases discussed above reveal a common theme: de-
bates about how to decide "who decides." The authority for-
malists focused on legal texts and the need for clear division of
authority. The authority functionalists were willing to apply
moral judgment and common sense to achieve results they
perceived to be fair.
These cases are only a sample of all cases that divide along
the Court's second dimension; a full treatment is beyond the
scope of this Article. There are certainly some cases that are
not easily explained in terms of boundaries of authority, just as
there are some cases dividing along the first dimension that are
not overtly political.3 60 There are also cases arguably involving
boundaries of authority that did not divide along the second
dimension.3 6 ' Nevertheless, these cases illustrate common




The two-dimensional representation of the Court provides
a deeper understanding of the Justices and their philosophies.
The first dimension captures the prominent divide between the
liberal and conservative blocs, but the second dimension ex-
plains many of the disagreements among the Justices within
each bloc. For example, the differences between Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer or between Justices Scalia and Alito are better
explained as disagreements about institutional authority
rather than degrees of ideological moderation or extremism.
358 Id. at 690.
359 See icL at 692 (criticizing the majority for "distort[ing] the statute . in
order to rectify a perceived wrong that, while heartbreaking at the time, was a
correct application of federal law").
360 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
361 Notably, cases involving preemption, jurisdiction, and judicial deference to
administrative agencies present a complicated picture, with some dividing along
the first dimension and others along the second. A full treatment of these cases is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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By themselves, voting alignments do not convey any mean-
ing about the Court's holdings. In a practical sense, however,
these alignments help to clarify the Justices' motivations. In
areas that often generate authority divides, the findings in this
Article may prove useful in understanding the evolution of pre-
cedent and in predicting future decisions.
The findings here do not undermine the importance of the
political divide within the Court. However, these findings pro-
vide an important qualification. The fact that Justices are con-
cerned with matters of legal principle distinct from ordinary
political concerns matters for many debates about the scope of
the Court's authority.3 6 2 Critiques ofjudicial review, for exam-
ple, are often premised on the belief that the Justices behave
like unaccountable policy makers.3 6 3 Similarly, arguments in
favor of judicial deference to administrative agencies often rely
on the perception that judicial review of agencies is largely
political. 364 If Justices were nothing more than policymak-
ers,36 5 it would be hard to justify empowering them to decide
divisive issues of social policy.
Although this Article focused on cases that most directly
divided along the authority dimension, many cases may divide
along both dimensions, especially when they implicate both
substantive policy and boundaries of authority. Decision mak-
ing on the Supreme Court becomes much more complicated,
however, when the Justices have multidimensional preferences
over the issues presented in a case.
In cases implicating both dimensions, for example, there is
a potential for Condorcet cycling;3 66 whenever there are more
than two possible outcomes, there may be no holding that
would be chosen by a majority vote over all the others.36 7 For
example, if the Court has a choice between a liberal rule, a
362 See Fischman, supra note 33, at S288-89 (discussing how criticisms of the
Court and efforts to curtail its power are often rooted in claims that the justices
are exercising political power).
363 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 124 (2009) (arguing that the premise that "the
Court's constitutional decisions-like legislative enactments-are political acts
and should therefore reflect the political wishes of the current majority" is "im-
plicit in both the counter-majoritarian critique ofjudicial review and ... calls for
popular constitutionalism").
364 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (2006).
365 See Fischman, supra note 33.
366 For general background on dimensionality and cycling, see DENNIS C. MUEL-
LER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 84-92 (2003).
367 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 815-17 (1982).
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conservative rule, and a balancing test, there may be majorities
that prefer the liberal rule to the conservative rule, the con-
servative rule to the balancing test, and the balancing test to
the liberal rule. How the Court reaches a decision among these
choices will then depend on the order in which these choices
are considered. If the order is determined by arbitrary factors,
then the Court's ultimate choice will incorporate this arbitrari-
ness as well.
Cycling will not occur, however, when two conditions are
met. First, the Justices must have one-dimensional prefer-
ences. For example, potential decisions in a case may be repre-
sented by points on a spectrum, and each Justice has an ideal
policy within that spectrum. Second, their preferences must be
"single-peaked," meaning that they always prefer a choice
closer to their ideal than a choice that is further away. If these
two conditions are satisfied, then there will be no cycling. A
famous result in social choice theory, the "Median Voter Theo-
rem," guarantees that the outcome preferred by the median
Justice will prevail against all other choices in a majority
vote.3 68
Thus, the dimensionality of the voting structure has impor-
tant implications for the process of collective decision making
on the Court. In cases where the Justices' voting structure is
one-dimensional, the median Justice will be pivotal as long as
preferences are single-peaked. In such cases, advocates before
the Court should target the median Justice, drafting briefs and
preparing for oral argument with a singular focus on the me-
dian's concerns.36 9 If Justices consistently hold unidimen-
stonal preferences in a particular area of law, doctrine will also
likely evolve in directions that are predictable and coherent.
The two-dimensional voting structure in the Court sug-
gests that issues of cycling may arise more frequently than
some scholars have acknowledged.3 7 0 In particular cases,
scholars may overlook multidimensionality by focusing only on
the public policy implications of a case while ignoring ques-
tions about authority. In the above example, the balancing test
may appear to many observers to be the intermediate outcome
368 See generally Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,
56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948).
369 See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Arnicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 608
(1984) (arguing that a good amicus brief should be targeted toward the swing
justice).
370 See, e.g., Martin, Quinn & Epstein, supra note 25, at 1284 n.35 (contend-
ing that "the great majority of disputes before the Supreme Court" do not "violate
the condition of a single-dimension issue space").
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between the liberal rule and the conservative rule, so that the
conditions of the Median Voter Theorem are satisfied. The re-
sults in this Article suggest, however, that balancing is not
always an intermediate outcome. As the cases discussed here
demonstrate, Justices may care far more about who performs
the balancing than about the immediate policy consequences.
When Justices are deliberating in a two-dimensional issue
space, the potential for cycling arises. The task for advocates
becomes much more complex than targeting the median Jus-
tice; indeed, there may be not even be a median Justice in a
two-dimensional issue space.3 7 1 There could be one swing
Justice in the political dimension and a different swing Justice
in the authority dimension. If a case involves both substantive
policy and questions about institutional authority, an advocate
may succeed by convincing Justices to view one or the other as
the primary issue. Finally, if the Court's decisions will depend
on the order in which issues are decided, then an advocate
must pay close attention to agenda-setting and ensuring that
the questions are addressed in an order that is favorable to that
advocate's side. Precedent may evolve in arbitrary and unpre-
dictable ways, depending on how advocates and the Justices
themselves set the Court's agenda.
The "doctrinal paradox" may arise where the disposition
supported by a majority of votes within the Court may clash
with reasoning that is endorsed by a majority of the Jus-
tices.372 In one prominent illustration of this paradox,
Apodaca v. Oregon,3 73 the Justices voted 5-4 that federal crim-
inal trials required unanimous jury verdicts, but one Justice in
the majority switched sides with regard to state criminal tri-
als.3 74 Thus, the Court applied different standards for federal
and state trials, even though eight Justices believed that the
same standard should apply for both.3 7 5 This peculiar out-
come occurred because of the order in which the issues were
presented. The doctrinal paradox is largely avoided when cases
371 See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, "Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About
the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 219, 230-32 (1996)
(arguing that the Median voter Theorem will not apply in many Supreme Court
cases due to multidimensionality).
372 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 453 (1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10-12
(1993).
373 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
374 See id.
375 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 372, at 27-28.
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fall within a one-dimensional issue space,3 7 6 but may arise, as
in Apodaca, when the Justices are voting in a multidimen-
sional space.
Plurality opinions may also be more likely to occur when
the Justices are operating in a two-dimensional space, and the
resulting opinions may be more difficult to interpret. When
courts seek to infer the holding of a plurality judgment, they
apply the "narrowest grounds" rule, which provides that "the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds."3 77 In a multidimensional issue space, how-
ever, there may not be a narrowest opinion.378 Thus, the
"narrowest grounds" rule may fail to generate a holding when
Justices were voting in a multidimensional space.
In positive political theory, many models of coalition build-
ing and strategic voting are based on a one-dimensional issue
space.3 7 9 Models that explore the interactions between the
branches of government typically assume that all three
branches occupy the same unidimensional spectrum.3 s0 One-
dimensional models are simpler, but two-dimensional models
may provide a more accurate representation of the various
branches. Empirical research in judicial politics similarly re-
lies on one-dimensional ideology scores,3 8 ' which may generate
misleading results in a two-dimensional Court. At a minimum,
the use of such scores should be restricted to types of cases
where the issue space is plausibly one-dimensional.
CONCLUSION
Using relatively simple scaling methods, this Article has
identified a two-dimensional voting structure in the U.S. Su-
preme Court over the last two decades. The two-dimensional
structure is statistically significant and stable over time. The
first dimension represents the familiar "political" divide be-
376 See Christian List, A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation over Multiple Inter-
connected Propositions, 45 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 1, 3 (2003) (demonstrating that
the doctrinal paradox does not occur when the judgments satisfy "unidimensional
alignment").
377 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
378 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS
OF SUPREME COuRT DECISION MAKING 106-09 (2000) (describing how the narrowest
grounds rule fails when Justices' preferences are multidimensional and
asymmetric).
379 See Fischman, supra note 33, at S287-88.
380 See id.
381 See Martin & Quinn, supra note 25 (estimating ideal points for the Justices
in a one-dimensional policy space).
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tween liberal and conservative Justices. The second dimension
explains a series of recurring alignments in cases involving the
jury trial right, the Confrontation Clause, the Fourth Amend-
ment, punitive damages, and the interpretation of criminal
statutes. This dimension corresponds to an "authority" divide
representing conflicting approaches to determining the bound-
aries of authority. Authority formalists have sought clear, tex-
tually based boundaries on delegated authority, while
authority functionalists have argued for flexible boundaries
that better serve social purposes.
This Article used a relatively simple scaling method in or-
der to be simple and transparent; more sophisticated scaling
methods may prove more useful in particular contexts. Fur-
ther exploration of the second-dimension cases may generate a
more nuanced theory regarding when it arises and the motiva-
tions underlying the split. The dimensions may evolve as the
composition of the Court changes. Further research will also
be necessary to determine if these same dimensions explain
judicial disagreements in lower courts. Nevertheless, debates
about the boundaries of authority will surely continue to oc-




1. Statistical Significance of the Second Dimension
Although MDS is most often used as a technique for sum-
marizing data, some scholars have combined MDS with
resampling methods for statistical inference.382 I use boot-
strapping, a common resampling technique, to compute stan-
dard errors for the scaling coordinates. The significance of the
dimensions can then be tested using a joint test of the hypothe-
sis that all coordinates in that dimension are equal to zero. If a
recovered dimension is merely noise, the coordinates in that
dimension would not be significantly different from zero.
Table Al displays the results of these tests, which take the
form of chi-squared tests with eight degrees of freedom. For all
dimensions, the critical value for significance at the 1% level is
20.09. In all three natural courts, the test statistic exceeds 500
for the first dimension and 100 for the second dimension,
showing that both are overwhelmingly significant. By contrast,
all subsequent dimensions are far below conventional signifi-
cance levels for all three natural courts. Although no statistical
test for dimensionality is definitive, these results support the
conclusion that the Court has been two-dimensional over the
last two decades.
TABLE Al: STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RECOVERED SCALING
DIMENSIONS ACROSS PERIODS
X 2 Test Statistic for Statistical Significance of Each Dimension
Dimension 1994-2004 2005-2008 2010-2015
1 986.0 391.5 312.9
2 175.3 75.9 61.5
3 2.0 1.8 2.0
4 3.1 2.9 3.2
5 1.8 2.5 5.4
6 2.6 3.3 2.9
Threshold for significance at 1% level = 20.09
2. Robustness Across Natural Courts
Table A2 displays the correlations in the Justices' two-
dimensional coordinates across natural courts, measured for
those Justices who were active in both time periods. The first-
dimension coordinates correlate almost perfectly across all
382 See William G. Jacoby & David A. Armstrong II, Bootstrap Confidence Re-




three periods and these correlations are all significant at the
1% level. The coordinates in the second dimension do not cor-
relate quite as strongly across all three periods, but these cor-
relations are still significant at the 10% level or lower. The
correlations for dimensions beyond the second are not dis-
played in Table A2, but these correlations are all weak and
statistically insignificant. The significant correlation of the
orderings across the three periods bolsters the conclusion that
the second dimension captures stable characteristics of the
Justices. 33













* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
3. Quantifying the Explanatory Power of the Second
Dimension
The above analysis demonstrated that the second dimen-
sion is statistically significant. However, statistical significance
does not necessarily imply substantive importance. Table A3
reports the proportion of variance explained by each dimension
for the three natural courts. Overall, the first dimension ex-
plains much more of the variance than the second: 79% versus
9%. It is on this basis that some studies have argued that the
Court is one-dimensional.38 4 However, many experts on MDS
383 See Heckman & Snyder, supra note 40, at S171 ("An informal method for
measuring dimensionality is to examine the stability of estimated preferences ...
over time. Assuming that congressmen's preferences are stable, factors that mea-
sure preference parameters should be highly correlated across congresses, while
factors that simply pick up 'noise' should be transitory.").
384 See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 25, at 58 ("Clearly a one-dimensional
solution is a very good one, but we can, nonetheless, almost perfectly explain the
data with two dimensions. The issue is very simple: which should we use? For this
paper we have chosen to go with the one-dimensional solution, for ease of inter-
pretation and because it explains so much of the variance in the data.").
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counsel against relying solely on goodness-of-fit measures in
determining how many dimensions to estimate.38 5






1st Dim. .79 .82 .78
2nd Dim. .09 .08 .10
Between Liberal and Conservative Blocs:
1st Dim. .92 .92 .90
2nd Dim. .04 .04 .06
Within Liberal and Conservative Blocs:
lst Dim. .16 .11 .11
2nd Dim. .37 .45 .50
Note: Liberal bloc includes Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, Souter, and
Stevens. Conservative bloc includes Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Jus-
tices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas. Moderate Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are
excluded from these statistics.
The first dimension explains nearly all of the disagreement
between the liberal and conservative Justices and between the
moderate and extreme conservatives.3 86 However, the second
dimension explains substantially more of the variation within
each bloc. Excluding the moderate Justices, the second dimen-
sion explains 41% of the variation within the liberal and con-
servative blocs, while the first dimension only explains 13%.
385 See BORG & GROENEN, supra note 49, at 48; Patrick Mair et al., Goodness-of-
Fit Assessment in Multidimensional Scaling and Unfolding, 51 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV.
RES. 772, 786-87 (2016). In the chapter on goodness-of-fit, Borg and Groenen do
not discuss the R-squared statistics used by Grofman and Brazill. However, they
discuss a related measure, "Stress- 1," and advise against relying on benchmarks
for goodness-of-fit. See BORG & GROENEN, supra note 49, at 247.
386 For the purpose of this analysis, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are con-
sidered moderates while Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are considered conservative.
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VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN CASES WITH SECOND-DIMENSION
SCORES EXCEEDING 0.61, 1994-2015
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TABLE A4: VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN CASES WITH SECOND-DIMENSION
SCORES EXCEEDING 0.61, 1994-2015
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